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Abstract
Up to now, the Euro has been successful in replacing the traditional European currencies and
in altering the landscape of European Capital Markets. Domestic users of the Euro are almost the
same in number as the population of the United STates, although the Gross Domestic Products of
the two economies are clearly not comparable. Still, if the Member States within the Euro-area
truly want to be recognized as an integrated capital market, some work must be done. This Article
will estimate, from current economic thought, what remains to be done and what can be achieved
in the short term. Some historical analysis will help in identifying the players and the main trends
at work. Moreover, some of the international issues that have been raised by the new role of the
European Monetary Union (“EMU”) will be presented.
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INTRODUCTION
To achieve high productivity with available resources, any
economy must develop an efficient way to allocate investment to
high-productivity projects. An efficient capital market benefits
the economy by lowering the cost of capital and ensuring its fi-
nancial sector is not tying up unnecessary resources.
Up to now, the Euro has been successful in replacing the
traditional European currencies and in altering the landscape of
European Capital Markets. Domestic users of the Euro are al-
most the same in number as the population of the United
States,1 although the Gross Domestic Products2 ("GDPs") of the
two economies are clearly not comparable. Still, if the Member
States within the Euro-area truly want to be recognized as an in-
tegrated capital market, some work must be done.
This Article will estimate, from current economic thought,
what remains to be done and what can be achieved in the short
term. Some historical analysis will help in identifying the players
and the main trends at work. Moreover, some of the interna-
tional issues that have been raised by the new role of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union ("EMU") will be presented.
I. PLAYERS AND TRENDS
A. EMU and Euro - Historical Overview
The introduction of a single European currency can be con-
sidered the final step in the largest monetary changeover to ever
1. See, e.g., J. Alfred Broaddus, Jr., EMU and the Role of the National Central Banks in
the Eurosystem, 1 RiCH.J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 61, 62 (2000) ("The aggregate population of
the 11 founding EMU nations (known collectively as the Euro area, the Euro zone or
'Euroland'), at close to 300 million, exceeds the U.S. population by approximately ten
percent").
2. Economists define Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") as the total value of all
"goods and services produced" by labor and property within a territory, usually on
yearly basis. GDP is the broadest measure of the wealth of a country. See A Case Study:
Gross Domestic Product - May 27, 2004 available at http://www.econedlink.org/les-
sons/index.cfm?lesson=EM225 (last visited June 15, 2005).
In the United States, GDP is calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
("BEA"). See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, News Re-
lease: Gross Domestic Product, Press Release, (Apr. 28, 2005), available at http://www.
bea.doc.gov/bea/newsrel/gdpnewsrelease.htm (last visited June 15, 2005).
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occur. The European Economic Community Treaty ("EEC
Treaty")3 set up the Common European Market as a way to fos-
ter a closer union among the people of Europe through com-
mercial interchange. At that time, however, the idea of a mone-
tary union had not yet even been conceived.4
During those early years, the Bretton Woods System, 5 devel-
oped in 1947, guaranteed a global monetary stability based on
fixed exchange rates, "whereby the United States fixed the price
of the dollar in terms of gold and all the other countries then
fixed the value of their currency in terms of the dollar."6 In May
1964, the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks7 was cre-
ated, whose function was to encourage cooperation among the
National Central Banks ("NCBs") of the Member States of the
European Economic Community. The Bretton Woods System
ruled the global economy until 1971: in that year, as a conse-
quence of the growing imbalance between U.S. imports and ex-
ports, the dollar experienced heavy pressure from the foreign
exchange markets. President Nixon had to acknowledge the
end of the gold standard, leaving the U.S. dollar free to float
3. See generally Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], available at http://Europa.eu.int/abc/
obj/treaties/en/entoc05.htm
4. See RogerJ. Goebel, Legal Framework: European Economic and Monetary Union: Will
the EMU Ever Fly?, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 256 (1998) [hereinafter Goebel, Will the
EMU Ever Fly?].
5. See, e.g., Josh Futterman, Evasion and Flowback in the Regulation S Era: Strengthen-
ing U.S. Investor Protection While Promoting U.S. Corporate Offshore Offerings, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 806, 812 & n.39 (1995).
A floating exchange rate system is one in which currencies are not pegged to
the price of gold or some other commodity, but rather float against one an-
other based on the international currency market's beliefs about the relative
strengths of the economies of each participating nation .... The system that
replaced the Bretton Woods regime is, in reality, a number of multi-lateral
arrangements that allow countries to have either floating, fixed or managed
exchange rates .... The increased control over monetary policy won by the
governments of the industrialized world after the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system came at the expense of certainty for business .... Once the
industrialized countries switched to floating rates, however, the financial mar-
kets quickly developed a variety of new services to assist international market
participants ....
Id. (internal citations omitted).
6. See Domenick Salvatore, The International Monetary System: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture, 62 FORDHAM L. REv 1975, 1982 (1994).
7. See History of the Central Bank - A Chronology of Main Developments 1943-
2003, available at http://www.centralbank.ie/data/site/abt-hist.pdf (last visited May 25,
2005).
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(i.e., devalue) against other currencies."
In 1971, while the Smithsonian Accord9 established a new
system of floating exchange rates, the Werner Report,10 named
after the Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Luxembourg,
contemplated the introduction of a single European currency by
1980, as a way to improve the stability of the European economy.
In view of the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, the Council
approved the Werner Report and planned to develop some form
of economic and monetary union. 1 Unfortunately, the mid-
1970s heralded a global recession, spurred by events in the Mid-
dle-East (the Yom Kippur War 2 and the subsequent oil em-
bargo), preventing the European Community from implement-
ing the provisions of the Werner Report.
In 1979, the European Economic Community introduced
the European Monetary System ("EMS")", providing for mutual
support between NCBs in the event of a foreign exchange crisis,
and granting European Community ("EC") currencies a decade
of relative stability. In 1989, Jacques Delors, then President of
the EC Commission, published a Report 4 outlining the propos-
als for monetary unification that were put forward by the Com-
mittee of Governors of the NCBs and several other experts. The
proposals of the Delors Report developed into the portions of
8. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Restructuring the U.S. Approach toJudgments on Foreign
Currency Liabilities: Building on the English Experience, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 139, 139 & n. 1
(1985) (noting wide fluctuations in U.S. dollar value after President Nixon's decision to
allow the U.S. dollar to float).
9. See Goebel, Will the EMU Ever Fly?, supra note 4, at 257.
10. See Report to the Council and the Commission on the Realization by Stages of
the Economic and Monetary Union in the Community, 3 E.C. BULL. no.11 (1970)
[hereinafter Werner Report].
11. See Goebel, Will the EMU Ever Fly?, supra note 4, at 256.
12. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Fishbane, Troubled Evolution of the Energy Policy in the EEC:
A Discordant Note in the Harmonization Process, 27 AKRON L. REv. 301, 312-13 (1994)
(describing negative effects on European economy in the 1970s due to the Yom Kippur
War and energy crisis).
13. See 11 E.C. BULL. no. 6, at 17-18 (1978); see also The Curo: Our Currency. Origins
of the Euro and the creation of European Monetay System, available at http://Europa.eu.int/
comm/economyfinance/Euro/origins/origins_3_en.htm.
14. The Delors Report "has been prepared in response to the mandate of the Eu-
ropean Council to study and propose concrete stages leading towards economic and
monetary union." Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Commu-
nity, O.J. C 329/44 (1989), available at http://Europa.eu.int/comm/economy-fi-
nance/Euro/origins/delorsen.pdf. See The Curo: Our Currency, Origins of the Euro:
Delors Report - the Roadmap to Monetary Union, available at http://Europa.eu.int/
comm/economy_finance/Euro/origins/origins 4_en.htm.
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the Treaty of Maastricht ("TEU")15 touching Economic and
Monetary Union ("EMU").
On June 1, 1990, the first stage16 of the process of EMU was
marked by the achievement of free movement of capital inside
the European Union ("EU") and an increase in responsibilities
given to the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks. The
TEU 1 7 amended the EEC Treaty, adding the goal of a Monetary
Union, introducing requirements to be met by Member States
and defining the three stages of the EMU-building process. Es-
sentially, only Member States with low inflation and proper pub-
lic finance policies could adopt the new currency, after delegat-
ing their monetary policy to the soon-to-be-formed European
Central Bank ("ECB")."
The TEU required, as a political criterion, 9 each Member
15. In December 1989, at the Strasbourg European Council, the Member States
decided to convene an Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC") in order to modify the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community or Treaty of Rome ("EEC
Treaty"). The result was the new Treaty on European Union or Treaty of Maastricht
("TEU"), signed at Maastricht, the Netherlands, on February 7, 1992, and entering into
force on November 1, 1993. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar.25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by Single
European Act, O.J. L 169/1, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], which estab-
lished European Monetary Union ("EMU") as a formal objective. The current version
of the TEU is published in O.J. C 325/5 (2002). The TEU mandated the deletion of
the word "Economic" from the original title of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty"); see also Nonna K. Crane, The Effect of the Introduction of the
Euro on Continuity of Contracts: Is the United States Prepared ?, 12 FLA. J. INT'L L. 511, 511
(2000).
16. On December 15 - 16, 1995, the Madrid European Council adopted the Delors
Report and launched the first stage of EMU on July 1, 1990. See Madrid European
Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, O.J. C 32 (1996), at 82; see also Dieter
Kugelmann, The Maastricht Treaty and the Design of a European Federal State, 8 TEMP. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 335, 340 (1994) (noting that during the first stage the European curren-
cies were fixed in relation to one another);Juan Luis Milldn Pereira, Economic Restructur-
ing and the European Monetary Union, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 45, 53-55 (2001)
(describing the first stage of EMU).
17. See TEU, supra note 15, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719; see also
John Pipkorn, Legal Arrangements in the Treaty of Maastricht for the Effectiveness of the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 263 (1994).
18. SeeJan Meyers & Damien Levie, The Introduction of the Euro: Overview of the Legal
Framework and Selected Legal Issues, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 321 (1998); see also RENE SMITS,
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK - INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS (1997) (providing a detailed
analysis of EMU provisions in the EC Treaty).
19. Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty"), art. 109, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79, incorporating changes
made by the Treaty of Nice amending the Treaties establishing the European Commu-
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State to guarantee the independence of its NCB from any politi-
cal authority.20 Moreover, the TEU stated the four monetary
convergence criteria21 that had to be met to join the third stage,
namely: (i.) price stability; (ii.) budgetary discipline; (iii.) cur-
rency stability; and (iv.) interest rate convergence. Further, the
TEU 2 2 provided that, at the start of the second stage on January
1, 1994, a European Monetary Institute ("EMI") 21 would be cre-
ated to do the following:
a.) To coordinate and supervise the Member States24 in
their transition to the single monetary system;
b.) To prepare draft legislation and other plans for the later
ECB; and
c.) To commence the technical preparation for the Euro.
Member States that qualified to participate in the final stage
of EMU began to be collectively known as the Euro-area.
In December 1995, the Madrid European Council25 offi-
cially adopted the name "Euro" for the currency, but no symbol
was adopted. In July 1997, the European Commission intro-
duced the "C" symbol,26 after its endorsement by the Dublin Eu-
ropean Council on December 13-14, 1996.27 The Commission
stated that the C symbol was "inspired by the Greek letter epsi-
nities and certain related acts, March 10, 2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001) (amending Treaty
on European Union ("TEU" or the Treaty of Maastricht), Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community, Treaty establishing the European Coal Steel Community ("ECSC"),
and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom
Treaty")and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
20. In accordance with the ESCB, ECB, and NCBs cannot "seek or take instruc-
tions from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State
or from any other body. See EC Treaty, id. note 19, art. 108, O.J. C 325/33 (2002).
21. See id. art. 121, OJ. C 325/33 (2002); see also Goebel, Will the EMU Ever Fy?,
supra note 4, at 304.
22. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 116, O.J. C 325/33 (2002).
23. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 117(1), O.J. C 325/33 (2002); see also Proto-
col on the Statute of the European Monetary Institute, available at http://Europa.eu.
int/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre334.html (last visited June 17, 2005). The Euro-
pean Monetary Institute ("EMI") replaced the Committee of Governors of NCBs and
European Monetary Cooperation Fund ("EMCF"), which were dissolved at the begin-
ning of the second stage of EMU.
24. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 117(2), OJ. C 325/33 (2002).
25. Madrid European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, OJ. C 32 (1996), at
82.
26. Commission Communication on the use of the Euro symbol, COM (97) 418
(1997), available at http://Europa.eu.int/Euro/dossiers/00278/html/pdf/EN-236_
236.pdf.
27. Dublin European Council, OJ. C 33 (1997), at 63. For an overview on Euro
2005] THE IMPACT OF MONETARY UNION 1263
Ion, in reference to the cradle of European civilization and to
the first letter of the word 'Europe'. Then two parallel lines re-
present the stability of the Euro. 28
On June 1, 1998, the ECB 29 was finally established, with the
primary objective of price stability, to be achieved through a two-
pillar strategy consisting of a planned growth of the monetary
base and of a broadly-based assessment of the risks to price sta-
bility3° in the Euro-area. 3' The ECB, based in Frankfurt am
Main, operates in cooperation with the NCBs of the Euro-area
Member States, within the European System of Central Banks12
("ESCB"). The United Kingdom 33 and Denmark obtained Pro-
tocols to the Maastricht Treaty enabling them to opt out of the
final stage of EMU, but reserving the right to participate later.
Sweden 34 did not qualify to join the final stage because it failed
to make its central bank independent from political power, as
required by the Treaty of Maastricht.35
As a result, eleven countries36 (Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal
banknotes see Euro banknotes and coins. From design to distribution, available at http://
www.Euro.ecb.int/en/section/Euro/banknote.html.
28. Commission Communication COM (97) 418 (July 23, 1997) (on the use of the
Euro symbol).
29. See The Curo: Our Currency; Origins of the Euro: Start of Second Stage of
EMU, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy-finance/euro/origins/ori-
gins_5_en.htm.
30. On December 31, 1998, the Council fixed the conversion rates between the
Euro and the participating national currencies, to be used for all conversions from
national currencies to the Euro. See Council Regulation No. 2866/98 OJ. L 359 (1998),
at 1-2 (on the conversion rates between the Euro and the currencies of the Member
States adopting the Euro).
31. See ECB, Annual Report 1998 (1999), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/
pdf/annrep/ar1998en.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005).
32. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 107, O.J. C 325/33 (2002); see also Protocol
on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central
Bank, available at http://Europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre324.html.
33. The result of the U.K. opt-out is that the United Kingdom maintains its powers
in monetary policy and the provisions of the ESCB and the ECB do not directly apply.
See Protocol on Certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northen Ireland, OJ. C 191 (1992).
34. Sweden did not obtain an official "opt out." The Swedish referendum held in
September 2003, on joining the third stage of EMU, was unsuccessful.
35. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 109, O.J. C 325/33 (2002); see also BERMANN
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAw 16 (2002).
36. On May 3, 1998, in accordance with Article 109j (4) of the Treaty, the Council
stated the 11 Member States which fulfilled the convergence criteria. See Council Deci-
sion No. 98/317/EC, OJ. L 139 (1998), at 30-35.
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and the Netherlands) joined in the third stage of EMU on Janu-
ary 1, 1999,y7 after meeting the five economic and political con-
ditions set forth in the Treaty of Maastricht and its Protocol. Al-
though Greece 8 initially failed to meet the convergence criteria
stated by the Treaty, it reached compliance during the period
1999-2000 and joined the final stage on January 1, 2001." 9
During the transition period (January 1999-December
2001), the Euro could only be used as a virtual currency along
with national currencies, but, in order to facilitate the transition,
the European Commission recommended that every retail activ-
ity (shops, banks, post-offices, etc.) display amounts both in Eu-
ros and national currencies.40 On January 1, 2002, the new Euro
banknotes and coinage were put into circulation in the twelve
Member States as the only legal currency.41 After February 28,
2002, national currencies ceased circulation in the Euro-area,
but until June 30, 2002, banks still accepted them for the sole
purpose of exchanging them for Euros.
4 2
B. European and U.S. Capital Markets - General Facts
In order to appraise the capital markets within the Euro-
area, the most intuitive approach is to compare them with their
natural U.S. counterparts.43 Even after acknowledging that sta-
37. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 121(4), O.J. C 325/33 (2002).
38. The Council decided that "Greece fulfil[led] the necessary conditions for the
adoption of the single currency." Council Decision No. 2000/427/EC, O.J. L 167
(2000), at 19-21, art. 1 ("on 19 June 2000 the Council decided in accordance with
Article 122(2) of the Treaty on the adoption by Greece of the single currency on 1
January 2001").
39. See The Curo: Our Currency; The Origins of the Final Stage of EMU and the
Birth of the Euro, available at http://Europa.eu.int/comm/economy-finance/Euro/
origins/origins_6_en.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005); see also Dominick Salvatore, The
Euro: Expectations and Performance, 28 E. ECON. J. 121 (2002) [hereinafter Salvatore, The
Euro: Expectations and Performance].
40. Commission Recommendation No. 98/287/EC, O.J. L.130/2 (1998) (on 23
April 1998, concerning dual display of prices and other monetary amounts); Communi-
cation of 4 June 1994, O.J. C 153/3, (practical problems involved in introducing the
ECU as the European Union's single currency).
41. See Council Regulation No. 974/98, O.J. L 139/1, art. 10 (regulation on May
3, 1998 concerning the introduction of the Euro).
42. See id. art. 15.
43. See MICHAEL A. KOUPARITSAS, Is THE UNITED STATES AN OPI'iMuM CURRENCY
AREA?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL BUSINESS CYCLES (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi.,
2001 Working Papers No. 22, 2001) available at http://www.chicagofed.org/publica-
tions/workingpapers/papers/Wp200l-22.pdf.
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tistical procedures and data-filtering techniques are different,
and that exchange rates can only add to the difficulty in achiev-
ing comparability, the advantages of a direct comparison make it
a valuable exercise.44 On the other hand, available literature of-
fers few reliable comparative studies: NCBs do not publish com-
parative analyses; financial services charge fees for them; and Ec-
onomic Research Institutes publish reports only after considera-
ble lapses of time.45
TABLE 1
Year 2001 U.S. Euro-area
Population in millions 285 305
GDP in trillions of U.S. dollars 10 6
GDP as share of world GDP 22% 16%
Exports as share of world exports 15% 19%
Stock market capitalization as share of national GDP 140% 75%
Bank loans as share of national GDP 12% 45%
Foreign exchange reserves as share of national GDP 0.29% 3.41%
Table 1 summarizes the few data46 available, but enough to
start a comparison between the capital markets of the two big-
gest economies in the world.4 7 Economists acknowledge that, af-
ter 1995, a U.S.-EU productivity gap set in: according to current
estimates, EU Gross Domestic Product per capita (the ratio be-
tween GDP and population) is between 65% and 70% of its U.S.
equivalent.48 Table 1 also documents the different ways in which
44. See Michael A. Kouparitsas, Is the EMU a Viable Common Currency Area?: A VAR
Analysis of Regional Business Cycles, 23(4) FED. RES. BANK OF CHI., ECON. PERPS. (4th Q.
1999), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economicperspectives/
1999/ep4Q99-1.pdf (last visited May 15, 2005).
45. See HM Treasury, Euro 2003: The United States as a Monetary Union (2003),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/theEuro/assessment/studies/
Euro_assess03_studsussex.cfm (last visited June 15, 2005).
46. See CARL GJERSEM, FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION IN THE EURo AREA 19
(Econ. Dept., Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Devt. ("OECD"), Working Paper No.
368, 2003).
47. See Rudi Dornbusch, The Euro: Implications for Latin America, Mar. 16, 1999,
available at http://www.mit.edu/people/rudi/media/PDFs/elatin.pdf.
48. See MICHELE CINCERA & OLIVIA GALGAU, IMPACT OF MARKET ENTRY AND EXIT ON
EU PRODUCTIVITY AND GROWrH PERFORMANCE 3 (Eur. Commission, Directorate Gen. for
Econ. & Fin. Aff. - Econ. Papers No. 222, 2005); see also GAFTAN NICODPME & JACQUES-
BERNARD SAUNER-LEROY, PRODUCT MARKET REFORMS AND PRODUCrTY: A REVIEW OF
20051 1265
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corporations on either side of the Atlantic have access to operat-
ing capital. In Euro-area countries, internal finance is the major
source of funding for the corporate sector, followed by bank
loans and trade credit.
Leaving aside the episodes of privatization of companies in
the Public Sector, in the Euro-area, bond issues come last in cor-
porate financing, even during the stock market boom of the last
decade. While some differences exists at the regional level, the
central role of banking in Euro-area economies is confirmed by
two additional facts: (i.) through consumer credits and mort-
gage financing, banks are net creditors of households; (ii.) fi-
nancing (short-term loans against accounts receivables) covers at
least half of bank loans to the corporate sector.49
The reasons for the importance of banking in the Euro-area
can be found in European History. At first, bankers were simple
businessmen who attracted deposits by the sheer force of their
wealth and attitudes,5 ° using this money to finance their lines of
business and to lend money to other businessmen. Later, politi-
cal power forced bankers to discover the production of money
without any collateral by arbitrary extensions of credits and the
forced loans needed to support them.5" Following the Austrian
economist Ludwig Von Mises, the part of money supply that is
not backed by any collateral, but only by the good faith (Latin
fiducia) of the depositories is called "Fiduciary Media".5 2
During the Middle Ages, mints and banks were worked by
private entrepreneurs, but by the end of the thirteenth century,
mints were strictly supervised by Court Officials. The practice of
National States of getting revenue by printing money is still
called seigniorage as it derives from the notion that minting
money was considered a direct right of the Kings. 53
THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON THE TRANSMISSION CHANNELS 4 (Eur.
Commission, Directorate Gen. for Econ. & Fin. Aff. - Econ. Papers No. 218, 2004).
49. See FEDEICO GALIZiA, MEASURING THE "FINANCIAL GAP" OF EUROPEAN CORPORA-
TIONS. AN UPDATE 10 (Eur. Investment Bank, Econ. & Fin. Report 2003/02, 2003).
50. See REINHOLD MUELLER, THE ROLE OF BANK MONEY IN VENICE 1300-1500 (1979).
51. See RICHARD C.B.JOHNSSON, FIDUCIARY MEDIA AND BANKING IN MEDIEVAL VENICE
REVISITED 7 (Inst. Change & The Devt. of Fin. Mkt., Working Paper, 2002).
52. See LUDWIG VON MISES, THE THEORY OF MONEY AND CREDIT ch. 16 (1953).
53. In ancient times, the seignorage was the tax paid by minters to the king: "the
changer also charged the bullion holder 6d per pound for the king's seigniorage, accord-
ing to 'the right and accustomed farm.'" Only later, with the advent of the National
Mints, did it acquire its current meaning of revenue from the overall money-issuance
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While working full-time for political power, bankers were
able to preserve their independence until the end of the seven-
teenth century. After the end of the Thirty Years' War,54 some
bankers put themselves at the exclusive service of their sover-
eigns and National Central Banks ("NCBs") were established in
1668, Risen Standers Bank in Sweden, later Sveriges Riksbank,55
and in 1694, The Bank of England. 6
The dispute on what powers should be granted to NCBs
continued for four centuries. After World War II, politicians as-
signed to NCBs the primary objective of reducing unemploy-
ment and granted them the power to develop tight controls over
the economy, implementing exchange regulations, limiting
credit offerings, and fixing exchange rates on international mar-
kets. 57 On the other hand, politicians felt free to criticize NCBs
when their policy did not suit them: Helmut Schmidt, then
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany), devised the
slogan: "Five percent inflation is better than five percent unem-
ployment," in order to criticize the attitude of the German
NCB. 8
With the development of the international markets, the stat-
utory objective of NCBs, namely, to safeguard the value of their
national currencies, caused them to fight against massive attacks
process. See CHICAGO FEDERAL RESERVE, NOTES ON THE ORGANIZATION OF MINTING IN
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND TAKEN FROM CHALLIS: HISTORY OF THE ROYAL MINT 99-103 (1992).
54. The Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) began in the form of a religious conflict
between Protestants and Catholics, but later evolved in a succession war for the preser-
vation of the Habsburg dynasty.
55. It is remarkable that the establishment of the first National Bank in 1668
originated from the default of the Palmstruch Bank, which became the Sveriges Rik-
sbank (National Bank of Sweden) under the authority of the Swedish Parliament. See
Urban Backstr6m, Aftermath in the US and lessons for Sweden, Speech at Conference
on WorldCom and Enron, Stockholm, September 5, 2002), at 2, available at http://
www.bri.org/review/r020913a.pdf
56. "The Bank of England was established by Parliament in 1694, as an explicit
temporary institution." J. LAWRENCE BROZ & RICHARD S.GROSSMAN, PAYING FOR PRIVI-
LEGE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BANK OF ENGLAND CHARTERS, 1694-1844 1 (Harv.
Univ. Weatherhead Center for Int'l Aff. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 01-
05, May 2001), available at http://dss.ucsd.edu/-jlbroz/EEHFinalTextLB3.pdf (last
visitedJune 22, 2005).
57. See Robert L. Hetzel, German Monetary History in the Second Half of the Twentieth
Century: From the Deutsche Mark to the Euro, 88 ECON. Q., Spring 2002, available at http://
www.rich.frb.org/publications/economic-research/economic-quarterly/pdfs/spring
2002/hetzel.pdf (last visited May 15, 2005).
58. See PETER A. JOHNSON, THE GOVERNMENT OF MONEY: MONETARISM IN GERMANY
AND THE UNITED STATES 78 (1998).
12672005]
1268 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:1257
from international speculators. International speculation, as op-
posed to NCB policy, was aimed at causing the devaluation of a
currency by aggressive selling on Foreign Exchange Markets.
Moreover, European NCBs had to fend off pressures from their
own national governments, who wanted them to finance public
sector deficits by excess borrowing on capital markets, and some-
times by printing money.59
In 1973, the Bundesbank (the NCB for the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany) began to declare monetary stability as its pri-
mary objective. As Otmar Emminger said in his inaugural speech
upon becoming Bundesbank president in 1977, "Monetary sta-
bility is linked up with general social stability - and with politi-
cal stability."6" After recurring episodes of crisis in the financial
markets, observers began to recognize that the primary task of
NCBs was preserving stability in the global economy. 61
A good insight into the process of integration in European
capital markets can be gained by comparing the evolution of the
first two monetary aggregates, MI and M2, for the Euro-area and
U.S. economies.62 In capital markets, the definition of the sup-
ply-side is problematic, as it involves questions on the nature of
money itself.63 For example, from a consumer's standpoint, a
banknote is as good as a credit card, but while the former is is-
sued by an NCB, the ceiling of the latter is controlled by a pri-
59. Bankers are proverbially discrete and Central Bankers show considerable re-
straint, at least during their public life. Sometimes, though, their real opinions can be
gleaned from their memoirs or from late interviews. See generally GuIDO CARLI, IN-
TERVISTA SUL CAPITALISMO ITALIANO (1975).
60. See DAVID MARSH, THE MOST POWERFUL BANK: INSIDE GERMANY'S BUNDESBANK
37 (1992).
61. See Alexandre Lamfalussy, Central Banks and Financial Stability, 2d Werner
Lecture (Oct. 26, 2004), available at http://www.bcl.lu/fr/bcl/pierre-werner/Discours
_Lamfalussy.pdf.
62. According to economists, demand and supply can be defined for any commod-
ity, including money, the principal vehicle for exchanging goods and services. The
monetary aggregates measure the supply for money. One of the tasks assigned to a
National Central Bank is to control the money supplied to the economy, i.e., the mone-
tary aggregates. "By buying or selling bonds, bills, and other financial instruments in
the open market, a Central Bank can expand or contract the amount of reserves in the
banking system and can ultimately influence the country's money supply." STEPHEN H.
AXILROD, TRANSFORMATIONS TO OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS. DEVELOPING ECONOMIES AND
EMERGING MARKETS 5 (1996), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues
5/issue5.pdf (last visited June 10, 2005).
63. See NICHOLAS Bouzou, How SHOULD WE DEFINE THE MONEY SUPPLY? AUSTRIAN
VERSUS MONETARIST APPROACH (Ludwig Von Mises Inst., Working Paper, May 1, 2001),
available at http://www.mises.org/journals/scholar/Define.pdf.
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vate-sector credit institution. In order to clarify the matter,
economists have classified at least three types (tiers) of money,
according to who is controlling their issuing processes. Ml is the
most basic form of money in an economy. MI consists of cur-
rency bills and coins in circulation, held by the non-bank public,
together with the amount of the short-term deposits held by
banking institutions in their NCB.6 4
Historical experience has proved that a scarce supply of MI
money leads to insufficient circulation and to recession.65
TABLE 2: M1 MONETARY AGGREGATES FOR
UNITED STATES
MI Money Stock
(Billions of Dollars)
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
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The above and following charts show Mi-money end-of-pe-
riod stocks for U.S. and Euro-area economies, in currency units
of U.S. dollars and Euro billions, according to the data pub-
lished by the Federal Reserve Bank ("FED") and the ECB. The
charts confirm that the European economy still has an Mi-tied
64. See MICHAEL EHRMANN & MARCEL FRATZSCHER, EQUAL SIZE, EQUAL ROLE? INTER-
EST RATE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE EURO AREA AND THE UNITED STATES (Board of
Governors of the Fed. Res. System, Int'l Fin. Discussion Papers, April 2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2004/800/ifdp8OO.pdf (last visited June 21,
2005).
65. "Following Friedman and Schwartz (1965), most U.S. economists seem to
agree that the severity of the Great Depression cannot be explained without reference
to the unprecedented contraction of the U.S. money supply." Roland Vaubel, Interna-
tional Debt, Bank Failures, and the Money Supply: The Thirties and the Eighties, 4(1) CAToJ.
249, 250 (1984), available at http://www.catoinstitute.com/pubs/journal/cj4nl/cj4nl-
ll.pdf (last visited June 10, 2005).
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TABLE 3: M1 MONETARY AGGREGATES FOR EURO-AREA
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structure, as M1 money stocks for the Euro-area are nearly
double their U.S. counterparts. The dependence of Euro-area
economy on Mi-money is further shown by the fact that the crea-
tion-rate of M1 does not show any indication of slowing down.
The second-tier monetary aggregate, called M2, is com-
posed of MI money stocks plus other forms of mobile capital
such as savings deposits, certificates of deposits, money market
liquidities and short-term repurchase agreements. 66 The gen-
eral concept is that M2 money can not circulate at the same
speed as M1, but can still be turned into liquidity with some ease,
since it is employed in short-term investments. 67
Charts Nos. 4 and 5 drawn following the same sources and
with the same conventions of previous two, show that Euro-area
M2 money stocks, although some way behind their U.S. counter-
parts, are indeed trying to catch up.6"
According to ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet, "The mar-
66. "[W]eak M2 growth may portend weakness in the economy . . .the current
definition of M2 includes currency, demand deposits, other checkable deposits, savings
deposits, small-denomination time deposits, retail money market mutual funds and
overnight repurchase agreements and Eurodollar deposits." Y. P. Mehra, A Review of the
Recent Behavior of M2 Demand, 27 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. Q. 83.3 (1997),
available at http://www.rich.frb.org/publications/economic-research/economic-quar-
terly/pdfs/summerl997/mehra.pdf (last visited June 8, 2005).
67. See EHRMANN & FRATZSCHER, supra note 64.
68. " [T] he process of financial innovation gained momentum throughout the fol-
lowing two decades, with substantial institutional changes taking place in the financial
system of euro area countries. Thus, in several countries, problems of interpretation of
monetary aggregates . . .arose." ALESSANDRO CALZA & JOAO SoUZA, WHY" HAS BROAD
MONEY DEMAND BEEN MORE STABLE IN THE EURO AREA THAN IN OTHER ECONOMIES? A
LITERATURE REvIEW 12 (ECB Working Paper No. 261, 2003), available at http://www.
ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp261.pdf (last visited June 10, 2005).
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TABLE 4: M2 MONETARY AGGREGATES FOR
UNITED STATES
M2 Money Stock
(Billions of Dollars)
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
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TABLE 5: M2 MONETARY AGGREGATES FOR EURO-AREA
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ket's size for commercial paper in the EU represents about EUR
1000 billion, which is about two-thirds of the size the U.S. market
for commercial paper."69
C. Institutional and Operational Players
The European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the
European Commission, the three leading EU institutions, can be
69. See Jean-Claude Trichet, Europe's Single Capital Market: Time to Tackle the
Toughest Challenges, Speech at Eurofi Conference Luxembourg (Mar. 10, 2005), avail-
able at h ttp: / /www.ecb.int/ press/key/date/ 2005/ h tml/ sp50310.en.html.
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considered institutional players. 71 Member States are both insti-
tutional players, in their role of national legislators and regula-
tors, and operational players, in their role of public debt issuers.
The other players on European Capital Markets, as banks, finan-
cial intermediaries, building societies and insurance companies,
are limited to an operational role.
In the development of the three stages of EMU, the Euro-
pean Parliament had only a consultative role, as stated by the EC
Treaty.7' The Council of the European Union or Council of
Ministers ("Council"), 72 among its many roles, held (and holds)
the legislative power in monetary matters. Moreover, meeting as
Heads of State and Government, the Council has a primary role
in deciding whether a State fulfils the criteria to join the final
stage of EMU. The European Commission,78 well described as a
"guardian of coordination through Euro economic govern-
ance,"74 is the executive and regulatory body, which exercises
the powers delegated to it by the Council.75
The primary objective of EMU monetary policy, which is to
maintain price stability,76 has been delegated to the ECB. The
union of the ECB and the twelve NCBs of Euro-area Member
States forms the ESCB.77 The ECB, in its institutional role,
adopts and enforces monetary regulations but also has an opera-
tional role on the capital markets. 78 With its "decision making
70. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art.7, O.J. C 325/33 (2002). "[T]he Council, the
Commission and the European Parliament share the political tasks of making and ad-
ministering Community law at the European level." BEImANN ET AL., supra note 35, at
34.
71. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, arts.121 (2), 112 (2b) and 189-201, O.J. C 325/33
(2002), (related to the European Parliament); see also BERMANN ET AL., supra note 35, at
51.
72. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, arts. 202-10, O.J. C 325/33 (2002). The Council,
or Council of Ministers, holds the legislative power, jointly with the European Parlia-
ment. The Council should not be confused with the European Council, which puts
forward political guidelines. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 35, at 34, 40.
73. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, arts. 211-19, O.J. C 325/33 (2002), (related to the
Commission); BERMANN ET AL., supra note 35, at 43.
74. See Kenneth Dyson, European States and the Euro 360 (2002).
75. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 211, O.J. C 325/33 (2002).
76. The Governing Council defined price stability as "a year-on-year increase in the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices of below 2%." Otmar Issing, The ECB's Monetary
Policy: Experience After the First Year, 22 J. POUCY MODEUNG 325, 328 (2000).
77. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 107, O.J. C 325/33 (2002).
78. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 105, OJ. C 325/33 (2002); see also PETER
BOFINGER, THE MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK OF THE ECB 7 (European Inst. of Public
Admin. ("EIPA"): EMU Halfway Through the Transition Period, Conference Paper,
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bodies," the Executive Board and the Governing Council, ECB
sets the monetary policy for the Euro-area.79 Moreover, given
that international organizations, such as the World Bank
("WB"), the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OCDE"),
and the Bank for International Settlements ("BIS"), as institu-
tional players, allow the ECB to participate, as an observer, in
their meetings, the ECB represents the Member States of the
Euro-area.8 °
National governments have both an institutional role, as
market supervisors, and an operational one as issuers of public
debt. The banking community and the investment community
are operational players. Banks, by far the biggest operational
players, offer services to their customers, according to banking
laws and regulations.8 ' Any non-banking company operating in
capital markets, e.g., a fund management company, a building
society, an insurance company, is part of the investment commu-
nity and constitutes an operational player.
In accord with contemporary government technique, the
process of decision-making in the EU is split at several levels. In
order to reach all the decision-makers, many pressure groups
find it convenient to produce position documents and to publish
their view under their own name.82 As an alternative, some
other players prefer to support independent think-tanks.8"
Sept. 18-19, 2000), available at http://www.eipa.nl/Publications/Summaries/1997_
2000/Phedon-papers/5-BofingerMain%20-The%20monetary%20policy%20framework
%20of%2Othe%20ECB.pdf.
79. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 107, O.J. C 325/33 (2002).
80. See Dominick Salvatore, The Euro, the European Central Bank, and the International
Monetary System, 579 ANNALS 153-67 (2002).
81. The European Banking Federation represents all European Banks. According
to their charter, European Savings Banks are further represented by European Savings
Banks Group, while Cooperative Banks are represented by the European Association of
Co-operative Banks. These three associations established the European Committee for
Banking Standards. See, e.g., European Committee for Banking Standards, at http://
www.ecbs.org (last visited June 15, 2005).
82. See id.
83. The Halle Institute for Economic Research and the Kiel Institute of World
Economics, regularly publish papers on European Capital Markets. See Halle Inst. for
Econ. Research, at http://www.iwh.uni-halle.de (last visitedJune 15, 2005); see also Kiel
Inst. of World Econ., at http://www.uni-kiel.de/ifw (last visited June 15, 2005). Both
are listed on the "NIRA's World Directory of Think Tanks 2005," published by the Na-
tional Institute for Research Advancement ("NIRA," a Japanese Government Author-
ity). See NAT'L INST. FOR RESEARCH ADVANCEMENT, NIRA's WORLD DIREcroRY OF THINK
127320051
1274 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:1257
D. Economic Theories
In the 1920's, John Maynard Keynes brought the role of
public expenditure to the attention of the economists.84 Accord-
ing to Keynes, an incremental increase in government purchases
will force the GDP to change by more than that amount. The
rationale is that since consumer spending depends upon in-
come, any sum spent by somebody gives someone else an addi-
tional income, which will lead to additional spending. 5
The Keynesian approach accompanied world economic the-
ory long after the Depression and well into the Cold War. 6 In
the 1970's, the necessity for a new approach became evident: ec-
onomic theories had to account for monetary circulation and
international trade.17 The so-called Monetarist 8 approach sug-
gested monetary policy, to be an effective instrument for control-
ling an economy.89
TANKS 2002 (2002), available at http://www.nira.go.jp/ice/nwdtt/index.html (last vis-
itedJune 15, 2005).
84. See JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY (1936).
85. "Keynes offered a theory of depression economics that asserted, famously, that
the market mechanism could not be relied upon to spontaneously rebound from a
slump, and that advocated public spending, preferably involving a deficit in the govern-
ment budget, to stimulate demand." M. WOODFORD, REVOLUTION AND EVOLUTION IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY MACROECONOMICS 5 (Frontiers of the Mind in the Twenty-First
Century, Conference Paper, June 14-18, 1999), available at http://www.princeton.edu/
%7Ewoodford/macro20C.pdf.
86. An example of how politicians misappropriated Keynes' theories is set by Rich-
ard Nixon. In his 1971 State of the Union Address, Nixon declared that "by spending
as if we were at full employment, we will help to bring about full employment". HERBERT
STEIN, PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMICS 172-73 (1985).
87. "The 1970s saw inflation and unemployment simultaneously at relatively ele-
vated levels for some time. The notion that this could occur was nowhere to be found
in the conventional wisdom of the ... Keynesian revolution of the 1930s and its subse-
quent empirical applications. Moreover, these models embodied the view that aggre-
gate demand expansion, from almost any level, would permanently create new jobs."
Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Remarks
at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm
88. "Monetarism, and new insights into the effects of anticipatory expectations on
economic activity and price setting, competed strongly against the traditional Keyne-
sianism." Id.
89. "In their Monetary History, Friedman and Schwartz reviewed nearly a century
of American monetary experience in painstaking detail, providing an historical analysis
that demonstrated the importance of monetary forces in the economy far more con-
vincingly than any purely theoretical or even econometric analysis could ever do." Ben
S. Bernanke, Remarks by Governor at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Conference
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According to this approach, the way to control an economy
is through the setting of the short-term interest rate and of the
monetary aggregate. Using a mathematical formula, it is even
possible to estimate at what value they should be set in order to
maintain desired rates for inflation and growth.90 Generally
speaking, current economic thought recognizes monetary stabil-
ity as the primary objective of an economy.91
To this end, economists try to identify and neutralize the
channels that can transmit economic shocks across the system.
According to the analysis of Angeloni and Ehrmann, 92 four
mechanisms can transmit monetary policy shocks in Europe: (i.)
Corporate loan interest rates, by influencing long-term invest-
ment decisions (the bank-lending channel); (ii.) Personal loan in-
terest rates, by altering the perception of risk of the consumers
(the consumer interest-rate channel); (iii.) Stock market indices, by
influencing the opinion of the consumer's own wealth (the asset-
market channel); (iv.) Foreign exchange rates, by influencing the
price of imported goods (the exchange-rate channel).
A more detailed study93 from the ECB, based on linking in-
on the Legacy of Milton and Rose Friedman's Free to Choose (Oct. 24, 2003), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20031024/. For an anal-
ysis of monetary factors in the U.S. economy, see generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA
JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 (1963).
90. "The Taylor rule seems to track, very successfully, broad policy moves since
1987. This success seems remarkable because Taylor's rule is so simple: It is set accord-
ing to only four components. The first factor is the Fed's long-term inflation target....
The second factor is the "natural" real, or inflation-adjusted, federal funds interest
rate.... The two remaining factors address the way policy should respond in the short
run to changing circumstances, namely, to changes in output and inflation. These third
and fourth components of the Taylor rule are the current rates of inflation and out-
put." See Charles T. Calrstrom & Timoty S. Fuerst, The Taylor Rule: A Guidepost for Mone-
tary Policy, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEV. ECON. COMMENT., July 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Com2003/0703.pdf (last visited June 15,
2005).
91. "Gradually the power of state intervention to achieve particular economic out-
comes came to be seen as much more limited. A consensus gradually emerged in the
late 1970s that inflation destroyed jobs, or at least could not create them .... That
inflation could reduce employment was a highly controversial subject in the mid-1970s
when introduced into communique language drafts.... Today in similar communiquhs
such language is accepted boiler plate and rarely the focus of discussion." Greenspan,
supra note 87.
92. See Ignazio Angeloni & Michael Ehrmann, Monetary Transmission in the Euro
Area: Early Evidence, in EMU: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE EURO 179 (Richard E. Bald-
win et al., eds., 2003).
93. See ROBERT-PAUL BERBEN ET AL., CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN MONETARY
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dividual models of National Economies in a harmonized overall
simulation, leads to similar results, recognizing five channels:
(i.) "The cost-of-capital channe': 94 the interest rate, as per-
ceived by the corporate segment of the economy, represents the
cost of operating capital, as invested in inventories and durable
goods. The shock transmission capacity of this channel depends
on the financial structure of the corporate-lending market."95;
(ii.) "The substitution-effect-in-consumption channe":9 6 the in-
terest rate experienced by the consumers represents the substitu-
tion effect between present consumption and future risk. Sens-
ing that interest rates are on the upswing, consumers can opt to
delay consumption and increase saving, with the result of propa-
gating a negative shock to the entire economy. This effect can
be reinforced by the structure of the labor market: self-em-
ployed consumers, who expect less job security, may feel a
higher need for precautionary savings;
(iii.) "The income and cash-flow channe': a rise in financial
yields increases the disposable income of net lenders and wors-
ens the cash flows of net borrowers",97 altering consumption ca-
pability. For example, in Italy98 households are net creditors, so
an increase in bond interest rates can raise consumption levels.99
In more mature economies, as in Finland and the Netherlands,
households are net debtors and a rise in interest rates can de-
press consumption; 00
(iv.) "The Exchange-rate channe":1 1 as almost all raw materi-
als (e.g., oil) and most imported products are still priced in dol-
lars, the Euro-dollar exchange rate is a powerful mechanism for
the transmission of economic shocks across the world econ-
POLICy TRANSMISSION 21 (ECB Working Paper No. 400, 2004), available at http://www.
ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp400.pdf (last visited June 13, 2005).
94. See id. at 21.
95. "For instance, effects may be larger in countries where firms are more in-
debted or where they borrow on short-term interest rates." Id. at 21.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. "In Italy, the positive contribution of the income channel reflects the fact that
households are net creditors, and raise consumption in response to the increase in
interest payments received on holdings of government debt." Id. at 25.
99. See Claudio Radaelli, The Italian State and the Euro: Institutions, Discourse, and
Policy Regimes, in EUROPEAN STATES AND THE EURO 212 (Kenneth Dyson ed., 2002).
100. See BERBEN ET AL., supra note 93, at 25.
101. See id. at 26.
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omy. 10 2 When the Euro devaluates in respect to the dollar, the
immediate effect is that European products become more com-
petitive in the global market, as their price in dollars is lowered.
Sooner or later, European manufacturers are going to pay more
for the dollars they use to pay their raw materials, and they will
be forced to raise the prices of their products. 10 3 In the reverse,
a devaluation of the dollar has the immediate effect of raising
the prices of European products, rapidly driving European offer-
ings out of the market, and effectively stopping industrial pro-
duction.1"4 (v.) The Monetary-circulation channel: although cen-
tral banks know that excess monetary supply can lead to infla-
tion; they are sometimes forced to finance public sector
expenditure at the expense of monetary circulation (e.g., by issu-
ances in National Currency or in Government Bonds)." 5
102. "For instance it might be expected that changes in the price of raw materials
and fuels, which are determined on international markets, would be passed through
into domestic prices. If this was the case, then a high share of such items in total im-
ports may be reflected in a larger change in domestic prices, following the change in
the exchange rate." Id. at 27. The first findings established for the exchange-rate the
role of a shock absorber, but with the notable exceptions of Denmark and Sweden
economies. MICHAEL J. ARTIS & MICHAEL EHRMANN, THE EXCHANGE RATE. A SHOCK AB-
SORBER OR SOURCE OF SHOCKS? A STUDY OF FOUR OPEN ECONOMIES 16 (Robert
Shumann Center for Advanced Studies, EUI Working Paper No. 38, 2000), available at
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/00 -38.pdf (last visited June 15, 2005). With a
more detailed analysis, new findings are consistently reversing this position. In the the-
oretical case of a long-run analysis of a two-country model "[w]e find an important role
for the exchange rate as a shock absorber. Specifically, most of the variation in real
exchange rates can be explained by relative aggregate demand shocks"; on the other
hand, in the short-term, analysts of practical cases note that "[e]ven if we extend the
model, and make a distinction between monetary policy shocks and pure exchange rate
shocks, we still find an important role for the latter. Hence, the exchange rate is still an
important source of shocks." KATIE FARRANT & GERT PEERSMAN, Is THE EXCHANGE RATE
A SHOCK ABSORBER OR A SOURCE OF SHOCKS? NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 15(Ghent Univ.
Faculty of Econ. and Bus. Admin., Working Paper No. 285, 2005), available at http://
www.feb.ugent.be/fac/research/WP/Papers/wp_05-285.pdf (last visited June 15,
2005).
103. "The Euro has hit eight-month lows after Dutch voters gave a resounding 'No'
to the European Union constitution .... The euro is still well above its launch value
against the US dollar, and its recent decline is expected to boost exporters in the
eurozone." Euro Sinks After Dutch 'No' Vote, BBC NEws WORLD EDITION, June 2, 2005,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/4602229.stm.
104. "The relentless rise of the euro has hit sales among Europe's biggest compa-
nies. In a swathe of corporate results this week, export-oriented firms have admitted
that the weak dollar is making covering euro costs more difficult." Dollar drags down
Europe's firms, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, Jan. 22, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/business/3419225.stm.
105. See BERBEN ET AL., supra note 93, at 34.
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II. BACKGROUND ON EMU INSTITUTIONAL INITIATVES
A. Financial Services Action Plan - The Lamfalussy Framework
In June 1999, the Cologne European Council adopted the
Financial Services Action Plan ("FSAP"),1 ° 6 seeking to create a
single market for wholesale and retail financial services and en-
force the adoption of state-of-the-art prudential rules and super-
vision."10 In March 2000, at the Council summit in Lisbon, the
Economic and Financial Affairs Council ("ECOFIN")'t 0 reaf-
firmed the FSAP and set a deadline for its achievement in
2005.09 At the same time, recognizing a need for extraordinary
measures, the Council established a Committee of Wise Men on
the Regulation of European Securities Markets, under the chair-
manship of Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy ("Lamfalussy Commit-
tee") 110
The Lamfalussy Committee published its final report in Feb-
ruary 2001 ("Lamfalussy Report"), recommending changes to
the legislative process for approving legislation on securities
market regulation."' t In its opening comments, the Lamfalussy
Report, referring to an integrated financial market, stated that
"the basic legislation is not in place."'1 2  The mosaic of Euro-
pean regulatory structures is well documented; there are over
forty of them, with different "powers and competencies.""' The
106. See Bank of England, The EU Financial Services Action Plan: A Guide, Q. BULL.,
Autumn 2003, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/qb/qb030309.pdf (last vis-
ited June 15, 2005).
107. See Trichet, supra note 69.
108. The Finance Ministers of the Member States of the European Union form the
Economic and Financial Affair Council, that is also known as the Council of Economic
and Finance Ministers or Ecofin Council ("ECOFIN"). See Ecofin Council, available at
http://ue.eu.int/showPage.asp?lang=EN&id=250&mode=g&name (last visited June 10,
2005).
109. See European Parliament & Council Regulation, No. 1606, O.J. L 243/1
(2002), Recital 1 (concerning the application of international accounting standards).
110. See Commission Decision 01/528/EC, OJ. L 191/145 (2001) (on the Euro-
pean Securities Committee); see also Pieter Bouwen, New Modes of Governance in Eu-
rope - The Impact of the "Lamfalussy Committee" on European Governance, Max
Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, available at http://www.mpp-rdg.mpg.
de/bouwen2.html (last visited June 10, 2005).
111. See Committee of Wise Men, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on
the Regulation of European Securities Markets, 96 (Feb. 15, 2001),[hereinafter Lamfa-
lussy Report], available at http://Europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/securities/
docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men-en.pdf
112. See id. at 18
113. See id. at 102.
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current regulatory system is simply "too slow, too rigid"' 1 4 and ill
adapted to the needs of modern financial markets. After recog-
nizing these problems, the Lamfalussy Committee proposed a
way of resolving them.
The so-called "Lamfalussy framework" consists of four
levels:"'
- Level 1: framework principles that the Commission pro-
poses to the Council of Ministers and to the European Parlia-
ment for co-decision.
- Level 2: the European Securities Committee and the Com-
mittee for European Securities Regulators will assist the Euro-
pean Commission in the definition of details.
- Level 3: cooperation and networking among EU securities
regulators to ensure common standards for implementing the
legislation developed at Levels 1 and 2.
- Level 4: cooperation between the Member States, their reg-
ulators; and the private sector in order to ensure issuance of na-
tional legislation and regulations.
The Lamfalussy" 6 proposals were endorsed at the Stock-
holm Council in March 2001, but Parliament delayed the adop-
tion until February 2002, and the final structure was put in oper-
ation by the end of the same year. On this occasion, the
ECOFIN r a y endorsed a Report from the Economic and Financial
Committee ("EFC")' 18 on financial regulation, supervision and
stability extending the principles from the Lamfalussy frame-
work to other financial sectors (banking, insurance, and pen-
sions)." 9
114. See id. at 14.
115. See id. at 19.
116. See RicHARD PORTES, THE EURO AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 19
(London Bus. School & Centre for Econ. Pol'y Research ("CEPR") Discussion Paper
No. 2955, 2001), available at http://faculty.london.edu/rportes/research/EuroIFS
(DP2955).pdf (last visited June 15, 2005).
117. See Council (ECOFIN) Report to European Council, Wise Men Report on the
Regulation of European Securities Markets No. 7005/01 (2001), at 1, available at http:/
/www.eu200l.se/finance/eng/pdf/07005-en.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005).
118. The Member States, the European Commission and the ECB form the EFC.
NCBs join the Committee when the issues require the NCBs' expertise. See EC Treaty,
supra note 19, art. 114(2) & (4), O.J. C 325/33 (2002) (listing the tasks of the EFC); see
also Council Decision No. 03/476/EEC, O.J. L 158/58 (2003) (on a revision of the
Statutes of the Economic and Financial Committee).
119. See Bouwen, supra note 110; see also European Parliament, Committee on Eco-
nomic and Monetary Affairs, Activity Report, 5th Parliamentary Term 1999-2004, at 41
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The Committee, reiterating the June 1985 White Paper,12 °
established two basic guidelines for financial market integration:
(i.) the mutual recognition principle,2 1 requiring only essen-
tial standards to be harmonized, allowing for the coexistence of
national variants and implementations; and
(ii.) the home-country principle, stating that in cross-border op-
eration of branches or provision of services, the regulations, laws
and practices of the country of incorporation must be accepted
by any country.1 22
In order to appraise the time and the effort it takes to pass
legislation in EU institutions, a few episodes may be of interest.
The Directive1 23 on Securities Trading and Prospectuses aimed at
simplifying regulatory compliance by standardizing a prospectus,
the proposal used in public offerings of securities, and a passport,
the documentation to supplement the request to trade a security
in a regulated market.1 24 While a first draft of the Prospectus
Directive was presented in May 2001, the final adoption did not
take place until July 2003 and came into force, with its publica-
tion, in December of the same year.1 2 5
The Regulation' 26 implementing the Prospectus Directive
comes into force in July 2005. The Commission 12 gave mandate
(May 10, 2004), available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/econ/press/5349
49pa.pdf.
120. See Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Mar-
ket: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 Final
(June 1985) [hereinafter White Paper]; see also BERMANN ET AL., supra note 35, at 540.
121. See LAMFALUSSy REPORT, supra note 111, at 104.
122. See id. at 13.
123. See European Parliament and Council Directive No. 2003/71/EC, O.J. L 345/
64 (2003) (concerning the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to
the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC) [hereinafter
Prospectus Directive].
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., Press Release, European Commission, Financial Services: Commis-
sion Welcomes Council's Adoption of Prospectuses Directive (July 15, 2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/ 1018&format=
HTML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
126. See Commission Regulation No. 809/04, O.J. L 149/1 (2004) (implementing
Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards infor-
mation contained in prospectus as well as the format, incorporation by reference and
publication of such prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements). The Regula-
tion was adopted on April 29, 2004 and comes into force in July 2005. See id.
127. See European Commission, Formal Mandate to CESR for Technical Advice on
a Possible Amendment to the Requirements in Commission Regulation (EC) 809/2004
Regarding the Historical Financial Information Which Must Be Included in a Prospec-
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to the Committee of European Securities Regulation ("CESR")
to provide technical advice, to amend the Regulation by Octo-
ber 31, 2005. The amendment is related to "the historical finan-
cial information which must be included in a prospectus"1 21 in
order to let the investor obtain an informed evaluation of the
issuer.
Attempts to create a common framework for pension funds
in the European Union go back to the early 1990's. In October
2000, the Commission proposed a Pension Fund Directive stat-
ing detailed rules of operation for banking institutions to run a
pension scheme on behalf of a company located in another
Member State.1 29 In application of the subsidiarity principle,t30
the organization of pension schemes is a matter essentially sub-
ject to Member States' sovereign competence. The Pension
Fund Directive,13 a which left a number of issues open to national
legislation, was finally adopted in May 2003. The deadline for
implementing the Pension Fund Directive is September 23,
2005, even though "Member States may postpone" the imple-
mentation until September 23, 2010.132
tus (2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/securities/docs/
prospectus/fin-hist cesr-mandate-en.pdf.
128. See id. at 1. On June 3, 2005, CERS published a Call for Evidence on the
mentioned Mandate. See The Committee of European Securities Regulators, Formal
Mandate to CESR for Technical Advice on a Possible Amendment to the Requirements
in Commission Regulation (EC) 809/2004 Regarding the Historical Financial Informa-
tion Which Must Be Included in a Prospectus: Call for Evidence (June 3, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.cesr-eu.org/
129. As a result, the draft Directive would encourage development of cross-border
pension funds investment. See Asset Management Expert Group, Financial Services Ac-
tion Plan: Progress and Prospects 3 (May 2004), available at http://www.epolitix.com/
NR/rdonlyres/AAB 7FFA-EA69-4FA5-BE44-2FOA3ADF50CD/0/AMWGFINALRE-
PORT.pdf (last visited June 17, 2005); see also Press Release, European Commission,
Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision: Commission Proposes Directive
(Oct. 11, 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer-
ence=IP/00/1 141&format=HTML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
130. See LAMFALussY REPORT, supra note 111, at 14.
131. See European Parliament and of the Council Directive 2003/41/EC, O.J. L
235/10 (2003) (on the activities and supervision of Institutions for Occupational Retire-
ment Provision ("IORPs")) [hereinafter Pension Funds Directive]; see also SIMON AR-
NOT, DIRECTIVE 2003/41/EC ON THE ACTIVITIES AND SUPERVISION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT PROVISION. A LEGAL COMMENTARY (2004).
132. See Pension Funds Directive, supra note 131, art. 22 (3), OJ. L 235/10 (2003).
During this grace period, IORPs may not operate pension schemes on a cross border
basis if they do not comply with the Directive. See ARNOT, supra note 131, at 61; see also
DEPARTMENT FOR WORK AND PENSION, IMPLEMENTING THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE ON THE
ACTIVITIES AND SUPERVISION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT PROVISION:
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B. EMU Gross Clearing and Settlement Arrangements
Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross-settlement Ex-
press Transfer ("TARGET") is used for the settlement of central
bank operations, and large-value Euro inter-bank transfers. In
2004, it processed a daily average of more than 267,000 transac-
tions, with an average daily value of more than EUR 1,700 bil-
lion.133 TARGET operates on the principle that payments be-
come irrevocable once the originating account has been deb-
ited: this feature, called "immediate finality"1 4 of payments in
central bank money, eliminates any settlement risk.
This means that all participants can deliver a payment to the
customer at the same moment they are credited with the right
amount of money. The implementation of TARGET was part of
the technical infrastructure required by the third stage of
EMU:1 35 EMI136 started drafting its structure in November 1994
and it started operation in January 1999, interconnecting na-
tional Real Time Gross Settlement ("RTGS")' 37 systems of fifteen
European countries and the ECB. Among non Euro-area coun-
tries, TARGET is linked with CHAPS (the RTGS system of the
Bank of England), RIX (the RTGS system of the Bank of Swe-
den), DEBES and DNF (the Bank of Denmark operates two
RTGS systems, the former for the Danish krone and the latter
for the Euro).
In March 2004, TARGET was linked also to the Polish Euro
RTGS system, called SORBNET-EURO and managed by the Po-
lish NCB Narodowy Bank Polski.3 8 Building on this experience,
in October 2002, the Eurosystem, the management structure of
TARGET, composed of ECB and the twelve NCBs of the Euro-
area, started designing a second-generation system ("TAR-
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION 12 (2004), available at http://www.dwp.gov.
uk/publications/dwp/2004/orp/govt_response.pdf (last visited June 17, 2005).
133. See ECB, TARGET ANNUAL REPORT 2004, 5 (2005) [hereinafter ECB, RE-
PORT], available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/targetar2004en.pdf (last visited
June 14, 2005).
134. See ECB, INFORMATION GUIDE FOR CREDIT INSTITUTIONS USING TARGET 8
(July 2003) [hereinafter ECB, GUIDE], available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/
targetguide-en.pdf (last visited June 10, 2005).
135. See ECB, REPORT at 43.
136. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 117(1), O.J. C 325/33 (2002); see also Proto-
col on the Statute of the European Monetary Institute, supra note 23.
137. See ECB, REPORT supra note 133, at 46.
138. See id. at 25, 41.
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GET2"),13 9 now scheduled to start operation in 2007. The de-
clared improvements of TARGET2, are to be found in service
levels, increased cost efficiency, and improved flexibility to fu-
ture developments, such as the projected enlargements of the
European Union.
The most interesting feature of TARGET2 will be its market-
oriented cost structure, based on the co-existence of a Single
Shared Platform14 ° ("SSP") and other national components. In
July 2003, the German, French and Italian NCBs, which account
for more than 50% of TARGET payments, have offered to oper-
ate the SSP, providing basic services at a single Eurosystem-wide
tariff structure. In December 2004, the ECB granted the three
partners NCBs the right to build and operate the new plat-
form.1 4 1 NCBs of accession countries will have the option of con-
necting to TARGET2 from the day they join the EU, and also of
using TARGET2 as their own RTGS system. 1 42
C. EMU Securities Clearing and Settlement Arrangements
In 1996, the Italian banker Alberto Giovannini' 43 was in-
vited by the European Commission to form a group of financial
market experts, known as the Giovannini Group, to offer advice
on how to prepare the capital markets for EMU. Up to now, the
Giovannini Group has produced five reports. The first report,
dealing with the impact of the introduction of the Euro on capi-
tal markets, was published in July 1997.114 The Giovannini Intro-
duction report became a major source for the process of re-de-
nomination of public debt into the Euro and in establishing
common bond-market conventions for the Euro-area.
Since then, the Giovannini Group has published reports on
139. See ECB, FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TARGET SYSTEM 62 (Apr. 2004), avail-
able at http://www.ecb.int/paym/pdf/target/future/mb-target2-future.pdf (last visited
June 10, 2005) [hereinafter ECB, FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS].
140. See id. at 63.
141. See ECB, REPORT, supra note 133, at 26.
142. See id.
143. Alberto Giovannini, then with Banca di Roma, now with Unifortune Asset
Management SGR.
144. See THE GIOVANNINI GROUP, THE IMPACT OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO
ON CAPITAL MARKETS (July 1997), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_
finance/publications/euro papers/2001/eup03en.pdf (last visited June 14, 2005)
[hereinafter GIOVANNINI, INTRODUCTION]. http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_fi-
nance/publications/euro-papers/2001/eupO3en.pdf
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the EU repo market (1999)145, on co-ordinated public debt issu-
ance in the Euro-area (2000)146, and two reports on EU cross-
border clearing and settlement arrangements, 2001 and 2003.147
The Giovannini First Cross-Border report affirms: "It is perhaps
no exaggeration to conclude, from the analysis in this report,
that inefficiencies in clearing and settlement represent the most
primitive and thus most important barrier to integrated financial
markets in Europe." '148 The basic objective of the clearing and
settlement process is to provide a safe and confidential transfer
of securities from a seller to a buyer, in exchange for a payment.
The European Central Securities Depositories Association
("ECSDA") 149 standard on cross-border settlement, which was
established as a result of the activities of the Giovannini Group,
recognizes four main steps in a securities transactions:
(i.) confirmation of the terms, as subordinate to the actual
execution of the trade;
(ii.) clearance of the trade, with actual exchange of obliga-
tions between counterparts;
(iii.) delivery of the securities from the seller to the buyer,
i.e. recording the change of property in a central registry;
(iv.) actual payment, through debiting and crediting of
funds.
When both delivery and payment are finalized, the transac-
145. See THE GIOVANNINI GROUP, THE EU REPO MARKETS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR
CHANGE, (Oct. 1999), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy-finance/pub-
lications/euro-papers/2001/eup35en.pdf (last visited June 14, 2005) [hereinafter Gi-
OVANNINI, REPO].
146. See THE GIOVANNINI GROUP, REPORT ON CO-ORDINATED ISSUANCE OP PUBLIC
DEBT IN THE EURO AREA (Nov. 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/econ-
omyjfinance/publications/giovannini/giovannini081100en.pdf (last visited June 14,
2005) [hereinafter GIOVANNINI, PUBLIC DEBT].
147. See THE GIOVANNINI GROUP, REPORT ON EU CROss-BoRDER CLEARING AND SET-
TLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS (Nov. 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/econ-
omy-finance/publications/giovannini/clearingll01 en.pdf (last visitedJune 14, 2005)
[hereinafter GIOVANNINI, FIRST CROss-BORDER]; see also THE GIOVANNINI GROUP, SECOND
REPORT ON CROSS-BORDER CLEARING AND SETrLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/economyfinance/
publications/giovannini/clearing~setdement-arrangementsl40403.pdf (last visited
June 14, 2005) [hereinafter GIOVANNINI, SECOND CROSS-BoRDER].
148. See GIOVANNINI, FIRST CROSS-BORDER, supra note 147, foreword.
149. EUROPEAN CENTRAL SECURITIES DEPOSITORIES ASSOCIATION, ("ECSDA"), EC-
SDA CROSS-BORDER SETTLEMENT, (Working Group on Cross-Border Settlement
("WG3"), Feb. 2002), available at http://www.ecsda.com/attachments/settlement_
links/dvpreport.pdf (last visited June 10, 2005).
THE IMPACT OF MONETARY UNION
tion is declared settled, and its results, size and price, can be
published for market-making purposes. Moreover, as everybody
agrees in having some obligation to preserve the confidentiality
of the trade, it is usual for the clearing and settlement process to
involve intermediaries in addition to the buyer and the seller. 5 '
A Central Counter-Party ("CCP") is an entity that interposes
itself legally by a process of novation: buyer and seller undertake
to consider the trade as cleared when the CCP has received no-
tice by both parties involved. In this way, buyers and sellers can
remain unknown to each other, since they interact only with the
CCP.15" ' Another entity is required to record the change of own-
ership: Central Securities Depositories ("CSDs")' 52 hold securi-
ties in paper form and record property-changes by some form of
book-keeping.
The result is that, for a successful transaction to be carried
out, at least four entities must be connected with the same infor-
mation processing platform: buyer, seller, CCP and CSD. In an
international environment, the two national CCPs, which re-
present buyer and seller, may resort to an international CCP for
actual novation on the trade. In the same way, when the transac-
tion crosses national borders, it is usual for the two CSDs to com-
municate through an International Central Securities Deposi-
tory ("ICSD").' 5
Another aspect of securities trading1 54 is that, as every posi-
tion must be financed, traders have to pay for the liquidity in-
volved, and are interested in using it in an efficient manner.
Consequently, CCPs usually offer netting services. In netting, at a
certain time of each day, the CCP offsets all the amounts owed
by and to participants in order to reduce all outstanding residu-
als to a single debit/credit between itself and each member. 155
The process of netting brings obvious savings in liquidity, at
the price of incrementing the risk factor: a default of a partner
could easily spread to all the others. In order to reduce the
probability of this event, netting procedures require a partner to
deposit some form of guarantee. Partners undertake to stop
150. See id. at 65 (concerning confidentiality and protection of beneficiary data).
151. See GIOVANNINI, FiRsT CROSS-BORDER, supra note 147, at 12.
152. See id. at 5.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
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trading when their amounts due or theirs securieties deficits
reach some threshold value. 156
Netting procedures can be convenient only when few in-
termediaries are involved. In the event of a cross-border transac-
tion, the amount of the guarantees involved and the uncertainty
about the costs and the risks can easily prevent the transaction
from being carried out. Building on this view of the problem,
the Giovannini Group identified "15 barriers" obstructing the ef-
ficient provisioning of clearing and settlement services in the
EU.
1 57
In its Second Cross-Border Report on clearing and settle-
ment, 158 the Giovannini Group analyzed what actions could be
performed to lower the above barriers. Interventions suggested
ranged from the technical-logistic levels (definition of new pro-
tocols for information interchange, harmonization of operating
schedules, etc.) down to specific incentives for achieving interna-
tional consolidation between CPPs and CSDs. 159 At that time EU
legislation was already in place, as in 2002 a Directive 6 ' was ap-
proved, specifically covering netting arrangements and the
broader use of securities as collateral.
Applying two base-principles of European Legislation, the
mutual recognition and the home-country principles, the Collat-
eral Directive affirmed that, whenever securities are held as col-
lateral by an intermediary, the legal system of reference is that of
the intermediary.' 6 ' In the special case of clearing and settle-
ment arrangements, universal opinion was this ruling to be the
most sensible, as it brought certainty and transparency to the
process of trading securities. The extension of this regulatory ap-
proach to the general case did not appeal to international ju-
rists.
Almost as soon as the Collateral Directive was adopted, the
Hague Conference, in its Hague Securities Convention, devel-
oped a ruling on the law applicable to any case of securities held
156. See ESCDA, supra note 149, at 12.
157. See GIOVANNINI, FIRST CROss-BoRDER, supra note 147, at 44.
158. See GiOVANNINI, SECOND CROss-BORDER, supra note 147, at 4.
159. See id.
160. See European Parliament and Council Directive No. 2002/47/EC, 0.J. L 168/
43 (2002) (concerning financial collateral arrangements) [hereinafter Collateral Direc-
tive].
161. See id. art. 2(g).
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with an intermediary.162 According to this wider ruling, clearly
not limited to the use of securities as collateral, securities held by
an intermediary are subject to a legal system of election (i.e.,
that must have been explicitly "chosen by agreement between
the account holder and the intermediary").' 63 In order to
thwart the institutional conflict that might have developed, the
European Commission acted swiftly.
In its Proposal for a Council Decision, issued in Brussels on
December 15, 2003,64 it recommended that the immediate sig-
nature of the Hague Securities Convention, followed by a second
step of ratification. This second step will be based on a Council
Decision requiring the approval of the European Parliament. In
the meantime, the Commission will amend the unfortunate Col-
lateral Directive.' 65 The proposal pledges that, in a favorable
scenario, the ratification of the Hague Securities Convention
may take place by 2005.166
D. Single Euro Payments Area and European Payment Council
According to the provisions of the EC Treaty, NCBs of EC
member countries had the task to "promote the smooth opera-
tion of payment systems".1 67 In 1999, this task was delegated to
the specially-formed ESCB, comprised of the European Central
Banks and the twelve NBCs of Euro-area member countries.168
Initially, Directive 97/5/EC' 6 tried to improve efficiency in
cross-border credit transfers by suggesting a number of "fair
dealing" principles: (i.) publicity and transparency in both the
charges and the cost structure; (ii. )compensation based on the
reference rate of interest applied to the period beyond the
agreed time limit for the transfer; (iii.) all charges to be borne
by the sender of the transfer, usually abbreviated with the "NOS-
162. See GIOVANNINI, SECOND CROss-BORDER, supra note 147, at 16.
163. See id. at 13.
164. See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision, Concerning the
Signing of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect
of Securities Held with an Intermediary, COM (2003) 783 Final (Dec. 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Commission, Signing of the Hague Convention].
165. See Collateral Directive, supra note 160, O.J. L. 168/43 (2002).
166. See Commission, Signing of the Hague Convention, supra note 164, at 4.
167. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 105(2), O.J. C 325/33 (2002).
168. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art.107, OJ. C 325/33 (2002).
169. See European Parliament and Council Directive No. 97/5/EC, O.J. L 043
(1997) (concerning Cross-Border Credit Transfers).
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TRO" or "OUR" keywords, except where explicitly agreed other-
wise. 17
0
As the market for cross-border retail transactions was ex-
panding, a number of surveys for cross-border credit transfers
confirmed that banks were not complying with the principles
stated in the Directive. In fact, normal bank practice was to
charge both sender and receiver without even asking the cus-
tomer. In addition, the surveys 17 1 brought to light the wide dis-
parity in the amounts charged, which varied depending on the
countries of origin and destination and a number of other fac-
tors. For example, in 2001, the average charge for a cross-border
credit transfer of EUR 100 was estimated at EUR 22.70, but the
effective price paid by the customer could range anywhere be-
tween EUR 3 and EUR 60.172
The Regulation implementing the Directive 173 covered both
electronic payment transactions and credit transfers, affirming
the principle of uniform charges: for cross-border retail transac-
tions, banks were to charge the same tariff they charged for do-
mestic ones. While the principle of uniform charges should be
applied to all form of payments, the Regulation states174 that it
will be enforced only for the electronic form of money, since
older means of payment (cross-border cheques, regulated in the
Geneva Convention of March 19, 1931)175 were likely to incur
higher costs of processing. Starting in July 2002, cross-border
electronic payments under C12,500 were to be effected under
170. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE EURO AREA 94 (2003),
available at, http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss53p04eu.pdf (last visited June 14, 2005).
171. See European Commission, Study on the Verification of a Common and Co-
herent Application of Directive 97/5/EC on Cross-Border Credit Transfers in the 15
Member States - Transfer Exercice (2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal_market/payments/crossborder/archive-en.htm#pricestudy2001 (last visited
June 14, 2005). The study collected data of the following indicators: Total time-per
transfer; Total cost-per transfer; Sender cost-per transfer; Foreign exchange loss per
transfer; and Receiver deductions-per transfer. See id.
172. See Press Release, European Commission, Bank Charges: Key Findings of New
Commission Study (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://Europa.eu.int/rapid/pressRe-
leasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/01/294&format=HTML&aged=l&language=EN&
guiLanguage=EN.
173. See European Parliament and Council Regulation No.2560/2001, O.J. L 344/
13 (2001) (concerning cross-border payments in Euro).
174. See id. Recital (8).
175. See Council, Common Position (EC) No. 41/2001, OJ. C 363/01, (2001), art.
2(a) (iii).
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the same charges levied for national payments."'
The same rules were to be applied to cross border elec-
tronic credit transfers under C12,500, but only starting in July
2003'. On the correspondence with their customers, banks
were asked to indicate the International Bank Account Number
("IBAN") and Member States were to remove any national re-
porting obligations (auditing procedures for balance-of-payment
statistics, or anti money-laundering activity) which could prevent
effective automation of retail transactions. 178 With effect from
January 1, 2006, the threshold of C12,500 will be raised toC;50,000. 179
After the United States, the Euro-area is the world's second
largest retail payment market, but its members still have widely
divergent payment preferences. According to a study of the Eu-
ropean Saving Banks Group ("ESBG") ,180 30.4% of Germans
pay by credit card, 47.2% of the French pay by check, while
60.2% of Italians still prefer to pay in cash.
Even after the adoption of international standards such as
the International Bank Account Number ("IBAN") and the Bank
Identifier Code ("BIC") 181 European Straight-through Process-
ing ("STP") rates are still 33% for cross-border payments com-
pared to 99% for domestic transfers,18 2 while the time to com-
plete a domestic transaction is about one-third of that needed by
a cross-border one.
176. See European Commission, Note on Practical Implementation of article 3 of
the Regulation No.2560/2001 on cross-border payments in Euro, No.MARKT/2902/
2002, (Directorate General for the Internal Market, Financial Institutions - Retail issues
and payment systems), available at http://Europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-market/pay-
ments/docs/reg-2001-2560/reg-2001-2560-article3_en.pdf; see also Regulation No.
2560/2001, supra note 173, O.J. L 344/13 (2001).
177. See Regulation No. 2560/2001, supra note 173, O.J. L 344/13 (2001).
178. See id.
179. See id., art. 3, O.J. L 344/13 (2001). The Regulation establishes that banks
cannot charge for cross-border electronic payments, and credit transfers up to C112,500,
more than for corresponding national payments. The amount of C12,500 will be re-
vised to C50,000 as from January 1, 2006. See id.
180. See EUROPEAN SAVINGS BANKS GROUP, ESBG RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION REPORTS OF THE FOUR INDEPENDENT GROUPS OF EXPERTS 4 (Position Paper,
Bruxelles, Sept. 10, 2004).
181. See Regulation No. 2560/2001, supra note 173, art. 5, OJ. L 344/13 (2001).
182. See Carol Clark et al., Global Electronic Payments, FED. RES. BANK OF CHI., EMERG-
ING PAYMENTS & POL'Y, Mar. 2004, at 14, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/emerg-
ing-payments..and.policy/files/global-electronic-payments 5-28.pdf (last visited June
14, 2005).
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A de facto obstacle to market integration is that most Euro-
pean countries have already developed a national Automated
Clearing-House ("ACH")'83 system, usually based on national
standards and procedures. Recently, £75 millions were invested
in the refurbishing of BACS, the United Kingdom's ACH.1 84 A
study by McKinsey & Co 8 5 estimates that the cost of the consoli-
dation of National ACHs is in the region between C1 billion and
C2 billion, with banks bearing the majority of the effort.
Not surprisingly, many bankers lament that regulatory man-
date (as opposed to customer demand) is the main force driving
towards a single European payment infrastructure. On the other
hand, many observers, though conceding that the issue is politi-
cally relevant, argue it could well be the only way to preserve the
decentralized structure of European capital markets, including
the banks themselves. In the end, European banks resorted to a
self-governance effort, undertaking to achieve a Single Euro Pay-
ments Area ("SEPA") by 2010,1"6 under the guidance of the Eu-
ropean Payments Council ("EPC"), t s7 the decision-making body
of the European banking industry in payment processing.
The EPC fostered the development of a Pan-European Au-
183. See id. at 5.
184. "Clearing house BACS has started work ahead of schedule on the second
phase of a £75m project to re-engineer its IT infrastructure .... Anticipated growth in
the volumes of transactions handled by BACS was the driver for NewBACS. The clear-
ing house, which is owned by the major banks, currently handles over 3.5 billion finan-
cial transactions a year, such as direct debits and standing orders, and this is expected
to rise to 5 billion by 2005." Andy McCue, BACS Ahead of Schedule with £75m IT Overhaul,
Aug. 8, 2002, available at http://www.financialdirector.co.uk/news/ 1130259.
185. See McKinsey & Co. Brussels, Creating a Single Payments Area for the Euro-
zone, Payment Systems Worldwide (Winter 2002).
186. See Jean-Claude Trichet, Testimony before the Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Introductory Statement, ECB (Mar. 14,
2005) available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2005/hdm/spO503l4.en.htm.
On March 14, 2005, Mr. Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank,
in his Testimony said that "the Eurosystem has requested that a Single Euro Payments
Area ("SEPA") be created for the Euro area from 1 January 2008," meaning that citizens
and enterprises could make payments throughout the Euro area from a single bank
account, using a single set of payment instruments, as easily and safely as in the national
context today. Id. In addition, "national infrastructures should migrate to a pan-Euro-
pean payments infrastructure by the end of 2010." Id.
187. See ECB, Towards a Single Euro Payments Area - Third Progress Report
(Dec. 2004), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/singleeuropaymentsarea
200412en.pdf (last visitedJune 14, 2005) [hereinafter ECB, Third Report]; see also Press
Release, ECB, Towards a single Euro Payments Area - Third Progress Report (Dec. 2,
2004), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2004/html/prO41202_l.en.html.
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tomated Clearing House ("PE-ACH")' 8 and on April 28, 2003,
the STEP2 consortium became the first service provider for PE-
ACH and started processing cross-border credit transfers.1 89 The
ECB estimates that to break even economically in its operation,
PE-ACH should process about 50% of current cross-border
credit transfers. 9 ° In the current phase of the economy, this
critical mass could be reached only by routing through PE-ACH
all transactions that were previously processed by correspondent
accounts, or by attracting payments from all EU members that
are not yet in the Euro-area. As target dates becomes nearer, the
future of PE-ACH and of TARGET2 is becoming more and more
intertwined with political issues, as the development of a Euro-
pean payment system is increasingly perceived as another mile-
stone toward European Integration.
III. THE IMPACT OF EURO AND EMU ON EUROPEAN
CAPITAL MARKETS
A. Money Market
The adoption of the single currency has effectively elimi-
nated foreign exchange risk from Euro-area cross border trans-
actions, and European Banks that are market-makers, ("Euro-
prime Banks"), can manage liquidity in a virtual single pool, that
is, can easily lend and borrow liquidity between themselves.19" '
Real Time Gross Settlement ("RTGS") systems, fully-automated
message systems used to transfer liquidity in the Gross Capital
Market, are contributing to the integration of Euro trading and
the settlement process.1 92 Short-term interest rates have con-
188. See ECB, Towards a Single Euro Payments Area - Progress Report (June
2003), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/singleEuropaymentsarea2003O6
en.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005) [hereinafter ECB, First Report].
189. "On Monday, 28 April 2003, EBA STEP2 went live ... for the exchange of
bulk payment files in the euro payments area." Press Release, SWIFT, EBA STEP2
Launched on SWIFTNet FileAct (May 13, 2003), available at http://www.swift.com/in-
dex.cfm?itemid=4290.
190. "[I] n order to ensure the economic viability of a PE-ACH, a first critical mass
of roughly 50% of the current cross-border credit transfer volume needs to be
processed via the pan-European infrastructure." ECB, First Report, supra note 188.
191. See ECB, Developments in Banks' Liquidity Profile and Management (May
2002), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/banksliquidityprofile02en.pdf
(last visited June 10, 2005).
192. See Intraday Liquidity Management Task Force, Intraday Liquidity Manage-
ment in the Evolving Payment System: A Study of the Impact of the Euro, CLS Bank,
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verged, as evidence of the complete integration of the short-
term money market.19 3
Through a mechanism of weekly auctions, the ECB lever-
ages on reserves regulations for setting the interest rate in the
money market. In the Euro-area, every bank is required to hold
an account with its National Central Bank, and (on a monthly
average) the balance of this reserve account must be greater than
2% of the amount of deposits and short-term customer loans. '94
After deciding in advance the liquidity it wants to supply to
the banking system and the minimum interest rate it is going to
ask, the ECB collects bids on Tuesday morning, and executes the
auction. On Wednesday, every bank receives its money allocation
on its National Central Bank reserve account - via the TARGET
Real Time Gross Settlement System.19 5 Between the auctions, a
bank, which wants to better its monthly deposit average, has to
borrow liquidity from its NCB or from another bank: the inter-
est rates in this "over-night market" reflect both the offerings of
the ECB and the overall status of the economy.1 96
The Euro Over-Night Index Average ("EONLA") is the refer-
ence rate at which liquidity is offered between Euro-prime banks
for very short periods, typically, the periods involved in the
processing of settlements, which spans between two successive
openings of the TARGET system. The Euro Inter-bank Offered
Rate ("EURIBOR") ' 97 is the benchmark rate at which Euro-
prime banks offer short-term deposits to each other. These two
reference rates are calculated from the data provided by a select
and CHIPS Finality 10 (2000), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/prc/ILM.pdf (last vis-
ited June 20, 2005).
193. See MASSIMO CIAMPOLINI & BERND ROHDE, MONEY MARKET INTEGRATION: A
MARKET PERSPECTIVE 6 & n.8 (ECB Conference, Frankfurt am Main, May 5-6, 2000),
available at http://www.ecb.int/events/pdf/conferences/5b.pif.
194. See OvIDIU PRECUP ET AL., THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF THE ITALIAN OVERNIGHT
MONEY MARKET 2 (Fin. Mgmt. Ass'n ("FMA"), Eur. Conf., Siena, Jan, 20, 2005), available
at http://www.fma.org/Siena/Papers/550999.pdf; see also ECB, The Implementation of
the Monetary Policy in the Euro Area 17 (2005), available at www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/
other/gendoc2005en.pdf (last visited June 10, 2005) [hereinafter ECB, Implementa-
tion of Monetary Policy].
195. See ECB, Implementation of Monetary Policy, supra note 194, at 29.
196. See PRECUP ET A., supra note 194.
197. See EURIBOR and EONIA, The Money Market Reference Rates for the Euro
para. 4, available at http://www.euribor.org (last visited June 20, 2005); http://www.
euribor.org/; see also Alex Skorecki, EURIBOR Challenges Dominance of CME's
Eurodollar DERIVATIVES, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 21, 2003, at 47.
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panel of European banks, and are used in the formulation of
interest-rate spreads as in, for example, "twenty basis points
above EURIBOR."
In order to protect the confidentiality of the data, the man-
agement of the panel is delegated to EURIBOR FBE, a Belgian
"international non-profit association "119 8 funded by the European
Banking Federation ("FBE") and by the Financial Markets Asso-
ciation ("ACI"). As the calculation of EONIA is central to the
operation of the settlement process, its calculation is affected by
the ECB. 199
For longer periods, from a few days, up to one year, repur-
chase transactions, usually called "repos," are carried OUt.20 0 A
"repo" consists of the exchange of a security and money with an
agreement to reverse the transaction at a later date and at a
given price. These secured transactions are used by the ECB for
implementing its monetary policy: every week, the ECB tenders
funds for the period of two weeks, at a selected interest rate.
With these open market operations, the ECB earns money,
exerting control over both the monetary aggregate M2 and the
primary interest rate of the market.20 1 Securities that are eligible
as collateral for the ECB have also become widely accepted as
collateral in the market for private repos: its reference rate is
called EUREPO, 2 ° 2 and is managed by EURIBOR FBE in the
same manner as the previous benchmarks. The EUREPO mar-
ket is used by private sector banking institutions to manage their
liquidity requirements.
Despite the efforts of the ECB, however, the adoption of as-
198. "Euribor FBE and Euribor ACI are Belgian 'international non-profit associa-
tions[,'] established pursuant to the Act of October 25, 1919[,] concerning the Grant-
ing of Legal Personality to International Associations with a Scientific Purpose (as
amended)." EURIBOR. The Benchmark Rate of the Euro Money Market, available at
http://www.euribor.org/html/content/faq.html (last visited June 20, 2005).
199. See ECB, GUIDE, supra note 134.
200. See GIOVANNINI, REPO, supra note 145.
201. The general perception is that up to the present time, ECB interventions are
mainly targeted to limit the consequences of the occasional liquidity shocks. See STEEN
EJERSKOV ET AL., How DOES THE ECB ALLOT LIQUIDITY IN ITS WEEKLY MAIN REFINANCING
OPERATIONS: A LOOK AT THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, (ECB Working Paper No. 244, 2003)
available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp244.pdf (last visited June 20,
2005).
202. The EUREPO is "the benchmark for secured money market transactions in
the Euro zone." EUREPO, A Single Reference Rate for a Unified Euro G.C. Repo Mar-
ket, at http://www.eurepo.org (last visited June 20, 2005).
20051 1293
1294 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:1257
set-backed securities in the Euro-area is not yet as substantial as
in the United States, and the national markets were somewhat
successful in resisting integration. 2°3 According to the Giovan-
nini Group,204 the securitization of the short-term capital market
failed for both logistical and legislative reasons. The cross-border
transactions that could lead to a real market integration are still
impractical to handle with the current trading and settlement
infrastructures.
Moreover, legislation is not helpful in stating the risk profile
of multi-stage transactions, the process of offering to a third
party the securities received in a previous "repo" operation.20 5 In
the event of insolvency of somebody along the chain, the last
taker of the collateral needs assurance that it has a perfect inter-
est in it, that is, free from the grasp of other creditors. 2 6 The
Settlement Finality Directive 20 7 and the more recent Directive on
Financial Collateral Arrangements 208 will improve the legal cer-
tainty of the private "repo" market.
The structural changes in the Euro gross money markets
have brought forward interesting changes at the retail level. 2 9
The Euro-area is developing a distinctive two-tier structure: in-
formal banking networks span Member States, with large banks
dominating the international scene, while smaller banks operate
at a local level. 21  The apparent reason for this is that usually a
small bank can be more selective in approving a loan, taking ad-
203. See NUNO ALVES, FINANCIAL MARKET FRICTIONS AND THE MONETARY TRANSMIS-
SION MECHANISM IN THE EURO AREA 5 (Aus. Nat'l Bank Econ., 32d Econ. Conf., May 27-
28, 2004) available at http://www.oenb.at/de/img/paper-alves-tcml4-10456.pdf.
204. See GIOVANNI, REPO, supra note 145.
205. See id at 7.
206. See id at 17.
207. European Parliament & Council Directive No.98/26/EC, O.J. L 166/45
(1998) (concerning the settlement finality in payment and securities settlement sys-
tems).
208. European Parliament & Council Directive No. 2002/47/EC, O.J. L 168/43
(2002) (concerning the financial collateral arrangements).
209. See FRIEDRICH HEINEMANN & MATHIASJoPP, THE BENEFITS OF A WORKING EURO-
PEAN RETAIL MARKET FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES (Report to Eur. Fin. Services Round Table,
2004), available at http://www.efr.be/members/upload/publications/63324working%
20retail%20market.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005).
210. See Valeriya Dinger & Jurgen von Hagen, Bank Market Liberalization, Market
Structure and Profitability: The case of Vertically Non-integrated Banking Industries, HALLE
INST. FOR ECON. RESEARCH, Dec. 2004, available at http://www.iwh.uni-halle.de/d/start/
News/workshop_31032005/program/Dinger.pdf.
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vantage of the segmentation of the market, while only a large
bank can access the cross-border capital market.
While big cross-border transactions are efficiently managed
on RTGS (Real-Time Gross Settlement) systems, smaller banks
are still relying for their operation on "NOSTRO" deposit ac-
counts opened at their "umbrella" bank, sometimes tying up li-
quidity and obstructing the tracing of money-laundering activi-
ties. 2 11
B. Government Bond Market
In the Government-bond market, a common platform,
named Euro-MTS,212 has been created for trading the bonds of
the twelve Euro-area member countries, with the exception of
Luxembourg. 213 Since the integration reached by the G-bond
market is second only to that of the European money market,
economists have been puzzled by the persistence of long-term
spreads between the National Debt issuances of Euro-area mem-
ber countries.214 Before the advent of the Single Currency, for-
eign exchange risk had been widely regarded as the main factor
in European interest-rates spreads: as short-term differences
dwindled to virtually nil, alternative explanations were proposed
211. See KLAUS ADAM ET AL., ANALYSE, COMPARE, AND APPLY ALTERNATIVE INDICA-
TORS AND MONITORING METHODOLOGIES TO MEASURE THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL MAR-
KET INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Report to Centre for Studies in Econ. &
Fin., Dept. of Econ. and Statistics, University of Salerno, Jan. 28, 2002), available at
http://Europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/update/economicreform/020128_
cap-mark-int en.pdf.
212. Thejuridical status of Euro-MTS ("MTS") is that of an Italian Private Venture
(SocietA per Azioni). Recently, Euronext, the Paris-based European Exchange, an-
nounced it had teamed up with Borsa Italiana, the Milan stock exchange, to make an
offer in the auction for MTS. See Martin Arnold, Euronext Makes Joint MTS Offer, FIN.
TIMES (London), Mar. 16, 2005, at 31.
213. The Banque Centrale de Luxembourg does not issue National Debt Certifi-
cates. In 1935, a monetary agreement linked Belgium and Luxembourg: accordingly,
the Banque Centrale du Luxembourg was not established until June 1, 1998 (the same
day as the European Central Bank), as it was a prerequisite for participation of the
Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg in EMU. For a short monetary history of Luxembourg,
see Banque Centrale du Luxembourg, Monetary History, at http://www.bcl.lu/en/bcl/
history/index.html (last visited June 20, 2005).
214. See ROBERTO BLANCO, EURO AREA GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKETS: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET FUNCTIONING (Bank for Int'l Settlements
Papers No. 12.2, 2002), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispapl2d.pdf
(last visited June 20, 2005).
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for the residual differences in long-term interest rates. 21 5
If the differences were to be ascribed to liquidity factors,
they could be considered a sign of market inefficiency, and acted
upon by adjustments in debt management policies by NCBs and
Market Regulators. 216 The twelve Euro-area member countries
plan their issuance calendar on a yearly basis, but they still re-
gard the issuance of National Debt as a sovereign competence,
and adopt different issuing techniques. Current standards call
for a two-stage procedure: after a first-round competitive auc-
tion, aimed at setting the interest rate of the issue, there is a
second phase during which non-competitive bidding takes
place.217
In 2000, the Giovannini Group,218 recognizing wide differ-
ences in relative shares and durations, focused on the coordina-
tion of debt issuance, but in the end the Giovannini Group was
unable to publish a recommendation, as a result of disparity be-
tween national views. On the other hand, if the long-term inter-
est spreads could be explained by different credit risks, they
should be evaluated as the indication of an efficient G-Bond
market, which allocates capital to each National Economy ac-
cording to its expected results. Perhaps the main obstacle to
resolving the puzzle lies in the evaluation of anecdotal evidence
and quantitative data, and it will be difficult to reach a definitive
explanation.
For instance, although pension system deficits are not pub-
lished among the fundamentals of a National Economy, the uni-
versal opinion is they have some impact on National Debt risk
factors.219 On the other hand, quantitative analysis has shown
that, contrary to common prejudice, the liquidity of the futures'
215. See Lorenzo Codogno et al., Yield Spreads on EMU Government Bonds, in EMU:
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE EURO 503-32 (Baldwin et al., eds., 2003).
216. See GJERSEM, supra note 46; see also KERSTIN BERNOTH ET AL., SOVEREIGN RISK
PREMIA IN THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT BOND MARET (ECB Working Paper No. 369,
2004), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp369.pdf (last visited
June 20, 2005).
217. See EU ECON. AND FIN. COMMITrEE, PROGRESS REPORT ON NATIONAL ISSUING
CALENDARS AND PROCEDURES FOR EU NATIONAL GOVERNMENT BILLS AND BONDS (Oct.
2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy-finance/publications/efc/
report2.pdf.
218. See GIOVANNINI, PUBLIC DEBT, supra note 146.
219. "Given the public knowledge of the pension system dynamics, participants in
financial markets would anticipate the unsustainability of delaying pension system re-
form and require higher risk premia on new debt." Willem F. Duisenberg, Speech at
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market for German G-Bonds has no influence on long-term in-
terest spreads. 220 The evaluation of the interest rate spread 221 is
of great relevance for countries like Italy and Belgium, which
feature high values for gearing (this ratio of National Debt vs.
Gross Domestic Product should not exceed 60%, according to
the Maastricht criterion of budgetary discipline). In the Italian
economy, surges in short-term interest rates can soak up availa-
ble resources, effectively blocking public expenditure and con-
sumer consumption.222
C. Corporate Bond Markets
In the fixed income securities market, the history of the
adoption of Euro in bond denominations can be represented as
a success without any doubt. The surge in issuance in 1999 was
the attempt to recover from the bad year of 1998 (Russian Debt
default, Long-Term Capital Management crisis)223 In 2000 and
2001, the sector continued to grow, but some of the new issu-
ances were simply replacement for previous issues.2 2 4 In 2002,
the Second Swedish Nat'l Pension Fund, Developments in the International Financial
Market 1, (Sept. 26, 2001), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r010928a.pdf.
220. See Astrid Van Landschoot, Sovereign Credit Spreads and the Composition of
the Government Budget 15 (2001), available at http://www.eco.fundp.ac.be/affi2001/
122.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005).
221. See Codogno et al., supra note 215, at 214; see also Marco Pagano & Ernst-
Ludwig von Thadden, European Bond Market Under EMU, 20.4 OxFoRD REV. ECON. POL'Y
531 (2004).
222. See E. GENNARI ET AL., DEALING WITH UNEXPECTED SHOCKS TO THE BUDGET,
(Banca d'Italia, Temi di Discussione del Servizio Studi No. 478, June 2003), available at
http://www.bancaditalia.it/ricerca/consultazioni/temidi/tdO3/td478/en_tema_478_
03.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005).
223. See BIS Quarterly Review: International Banking and Financial Market Devel-
opments (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/r_qt991 lold.htm (last vis-
itedJune 20, 2005).
224. The issuance of corporate Bonds in Euro-denominations is followed by many
regular publications. The ECB publishes a Monthly Bulletin wherein relevant data can
be found under the heading of "Security Issuance." See ECB, Monthly Bulletin, available
at http://www.ecb.int/pub/mb/html/index.en.html (last visited June 20, 2005). The
Directorate-General of Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission
publishes a Monthly & Quarterly Note on the Euro-Denominated Bond Markets. See ECOFIN,
Monthly & Quarterly Notes on the Euro-Denominated Bond Markets, available at http:/
/europa.eu.int/comm/economyfinance/publications/bondmarkets-en.htm (last vis-
ited June 20, 2005). The Bank for International Settlements ("BIS") registers and ana-
lyzes Euro-bond issuances data in the BIS Quarterly Review: International Banking and
Financial Market Developments and in the BIS Annual Report. See BIS, What's New, available
at http://www.bis.org (last visitedJune 20, 2005). The OECD analyzes Euro-bond issu-
ance in the "Euro-area summary" of its annual Economic Outlook and in several occa-
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the corporate bond market fell, due to the deteriorating global
economic environment, but in 2003, the entire bond market
bounced back.2 2 5
TABLE 6:
EURO-DENOMINATED BOND MARKETS:
VOLUMES ISSUED BY TYPE OF ISSUER
In billions of euros
I Gomwm.n - Finani C-cwpora
Hions oferos
1 800 _
1999 2000
Source: European Directorate
Elaboration: OECD 2004
bIio, of euros
1 go0
8600
1400
1200
2001 2002 2803
General for Economic and Financial Affairs
sional papers. See OECD, Publications, available at http://www.oecd.org/publications/
0,2743,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited June 20, 2005).
225. "According to the international statistics of the BIS, the Euro overtook the
U.S. dollar in 1999 as the most heavily used currency for international debt issues."
Pagano & von Thadden, supra note 221, at 534. However, Pagano & von Thadden
remark that BIS criteria for classifying international issuing cover both financing and
investment components, an argument proposed by Carsten Detken & Philipp Hart-
mann, who stated that "This targeting... is a qualitative judgement [sic] made on the
basis of a number of criteria... Because of this last component, measures based on that
definition would to some extents combine financing and investment currency use."
CARSTEN DETKEN & PHILIPP HARTMANN, THE EURO AND INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS
7 (Center for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 2000/9, 2000), available at http://www.
ifk-cfs.de/papers/00_09.pdf.
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TABLE 7:
NET ISSUANCE OF US BONDS
Billions of US dollars
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Source: U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States
Elaboration: OECD 2004226
One of the simplest indicators of the role of a market in a
national economy is its capitalization or its current-price assets
value, expressed as a share of GDP. When computing the index
for the financial and the corporate sector together, the 2001 val-
ues were 73% for the Euro-area and 80% for the U.S. area, as an
illustration that the economic structures were remarkably similar
on either side of the Atlantic, at least at this aggregate level. 227
If the same calculation is performed for the corporate sec-
tor alone, the Euro-area share drops to 11%, which should be
compared with the U.S. result of 27%. This disparity illustrates
that financial intermediaries still retain much influence over
Euro-area capital markets, while in the U.S., the corporate sector
has more confidence in the bond market as a direct supply of
capital. According to expert opinion, "[c]losing the gap with
the United States in bond market financing of businesses will be
226. The previous charts have been published by OECD. See OECD, Highlights of
Recent Trends in Financial Markets, FIN. MKT. TRENDS, No. 86, Mar. 2004, at 17-18, availa-
ble at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/32/31098172.pdf (last visited June 20,
2005).
227. See GERHARD FINK ET AL., BOND MARKETS AND ECONoMIc GROWTH, (Vienna
University of Economics, Inst. for Eur. Aff., Working Paper No. 49, 2003), available at
http://fgr.wu-wien.ac.at/institut/ef/wp/WP49.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005).
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a very slow process. Over the last three years, the Euro-area has
started to catch up, but the speed is not increasing." 228 The con-
troversial Private Finance Initiative ("PFI") is one of the innova-
tive ways devised by the services banking industry to alter the
landscape of European capital markets. 229 The PFI originated as
British Labour's favored method of funding new public sector
projects: instead of relying on the traditional financing of build-
ing property, British Government sub-contracts the complete in-
frastructure (designing, building, management and staffing
throughout its operational life) to a purpose-built consortium. 230
The consortium leases the project, typically for 30 years, to a
public authority, such as a council or health trust, and gets paid
a fixed rate, as in a fixed-coupon bond. While PFI is widely rec-
ognized as an important channel for technology transfer,231
others have been quick to perceive its disruptive potential of a
consolidated market structure.
The most important piece of legislation promoting the
Bond Market in the EU is the afore-mentioned Prospectus Direc-
tive 2 32 that defined a European standard for the two documents
needed to qualify any issuance of securities. Investments Bankers
can now focus on the prospectus (mandatory proposal to be used
in public offerings) and on the passport (documentation used for
requesting admission to regulated markets), instead of trying to
follow the technicalities of National Regulations. 233 A Parlia-
mentary amendment granted exemption to companies with as-
sets lower than C350 million, encouraging small businesses to
resort to this form of financing.
Parliament has finally approved the so-called Transparency
228. See GJERSEM, supra note 46, at 19.
229. See HM Treasury, PFI: Meeting the Investment Challenge, July 2003, at 106,
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/648B2/PFI_604.pdf (last visited
June 20, 2005).
230. See HM Treasury, Standardization of PFI Contracts Version 3, April 2004, at
187, available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/B42/D9/pfi-sopc-ver3-com-
plete-apr04.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005).
231. See MANSOOR DALAmI & ROBERT HAUSWALD, The Emerging Project Bond Market:
Covenant Provisions and Credit Spreads, (World Bank Pol'y Research Working Paper No.
3095, July 2003), available at http://wdsbeta.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDS
ContentServer/1W3P/IB/2003/08/23/000094946_03080904015685/Rendered/PDF/
multi0page.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005).
232. See Prospectus Directive No. 03/71/EC (2003), OJ. L 345/64 (2003).
233. See id., OJ. L 345/64 (2003).
THE IMPACT OF MONETARY UNION
Directive.2 3 4 It is especially related to the introduction of regula-
tory practices for investment and pension funds, and particularly
of the so-called International Financial Reporting Standards
("IFRS") .215 As an integral part of the IFRS, LAS39 236 has devel-
oped a new accounting standard for derivatives, which was first
issued in March 1999 by the International Accounting Standards
Committee.
After 1998, the European Commission recognized the role
of IAS39, making it the central point of the Transparency Direc-
tive.23 7 .While the FAS 133 standard, developed by the U.S. Fi-
nancial Accounting Standards Board preferred to focus on a par-
ticular use of derivatives, the hedge, behind 1AS39 there is a genu-
ine effort to bring transparency and uniformity to the whole
field of financial instruments. 238
D. Equity Market and Fund Industry
From a theoretical point of view, the best way of appraising
integration on financial markets is to look for single-price evi-
dence. According to classical theory, in a perfect, non-seg-
mented, market, "assets generating identical cash flows" should
command the same price, regardless of the location of issuer
and holder.23  On the other hand, current theories admit that
different financial instruments can well have different pricings,
according to differences in their risk profile.24 °
234. European Parliament and Council Directive No. 2004/109/EC, O.J. L 390/38
(2004) (concerning the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to in-
formation about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market,
amending Directive No. 2001/34/EC).
235. "The Board of the International Accounting Standards Committee ('IASC')
between 1973 and 2001" developed the International Accounting Standards ("LAS). In
April 2001, the International Accounting Standards Board ("IASB") "announced that it
would adopt all the International Accounting Standard issued by the IASC" and "that its
accounting standards would be designated 'International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards."' International Accounting Standard Board, Overview of International Financial
Reporting Standards, at http://www.iasb.org/standards/index.asp (last visited June 21,
2005).
236. See ALESSANDRO ROSSI ET AL., HEDGE AccouNTING WITHIN IAS39 3 (Eur. In-
vestment Bank, Econ. & Fin. Report No. 2002/2, 2002), available at http://www.eib.
org/efs/reports/efr2nO2.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005).
237. See Directive No. 2004/109/EC, supra note 234, O.J. L 390/38 (2004).
238. See Rossi ET AL., supra note 236.
239. See ADAM ET AL., supra note 211, at 4.
240. See William Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under
Conditions of Risk, 19J. OF FIN. 425 (1964); see also ENRICO C. PEROTTI & ERNST-LUDWIG
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In the bond market, the interest rate can be an adequate
measure of the risk profile of the investment, and the spread in
interest rates is an indicator of financial integration.24 t On the
other hand, for equities it is not easy to define a simple indicator
linking the volume of asset capitalization, returns, and invest-
ment risk. Indeed, the EU's "Regional Innovation Strate-
gies"("RIS") approach aims to lower equity price-correlation
across member countries, by actively supporting geographical
and historical specialization.242
Equities funds are natural market-makers: it is only natural
to look at them for assistance in equity matters. Economists look
at investment portfolios of equity funds in order to appraise eq-
uity market integration. In a similar way, the European Commis-
sion recognized the role of the fund industry in financial mar-
kets when it asked the Giovannini Group to start its fact-finding
mission.
Relevant information for investment funds is collected by
the F6dration Europ~enne des Fonds et Socits
d'Investissement ("FEFSI") .243 Funds are classified according to
their international investment strategy and their preferred in-
VON THADDEN, THE POUTICAL ECONOMY OF BANK AND EQUITY DOMINANCE, (CEPR, Dis-
cussion Paper No. 3914, 2003), available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.
asp?dpno=3914 (last visited June 20, 2005).
241. See CLAUDIA M. BUCH, FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION IN A MONETARY UNION,
(Kiel Inst. of World Econ., Working Paper No. 1062, 2001), available at http://www.uni-
kiel.de/ifw/pub/kap/2001/kap1062.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005); see also JEAN
DERMINE, EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKETS WITH A SINGLE CURRENCY, WHAT Do WE LEARN?
77 (HM Treasury, Submissions on EMU from Leading Academics, 2002), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/AEE/C3/adkentO3_678910-418.pdf (last vis-
ited June 20, 2005).
242. "[T]he key sources of regional wealth creation are directly related to the re-
gional capacity to translate information and knowledge, in the form of intellectual capi-
tal, into economic opportunity." EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG REGIONAL POLICY, RE-
GIONAL INNOVATION STRATEGIES UNDER THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND,
INNOVATIVE ACTIONS 2000-2002 7 (2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/re-
gional-policy/innovation/pdf/guide ris-final.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005); see also
RAj AGGARWAL ET AL., DYNAMICS OF EQUITY MARKET INTEGRATION IN EUROPE: EVIDENCE
OF CHANGES OVER TIME AND WITH EVENTS 3 (Inst. for Int'l Integration Studies ("IIIS")
Discussion Paper No. 19, 2004), available at http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/Discussion%20Pa-
per%20pdfs/iiisdpl9.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005).
243. F6d6ration Europ~enne des Fonds et Socit6s d'Investissement ("FEFSI"),
represents the interests of the European investment fund industry. See FEFSI, RECOM-
MENDATIONS FROM THE FORUM GROUP ON "FINANCIAL ANALYSTS: BEST PRACTICES IN AN
INTEGRATED EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKET" (Position Paper, 2003), available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/securities/docs/anaysts/contributions/fefsi-
en.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
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struments, as declared to their investors. The statistical analysis
reveals that, after the advent of the single currency, international
investment funds increased their quota of Euro-denominates eq-
uities.
Moreover, "the average increase for the Euro-area countries
is stronger than for the remaining European Union coun-
tries.''244 On the other hand, the evidence gleaned from the be-
havior of pension funds and insurance companies is not defini-
tive, but it should be noted that, in this case, data is provided
only by financial research firms and that any problem in collect-
ing data should be considered an intrinsic indication of an im-
perfect market.245
In 2002, according to Eurostat estimates, the total number
of memberships in autonomous pension funds in the EU stood
at around 21 million.246 Observers feel that in the pension funds
and insurance industry, the trend towards concentration is
somewhat feebler than in the banking industry: nonetheless, re-
cently a rash of mergers & acquisitions occurred between insur-
ers and banks throughout Euro-area countries, known as "ban-
cassurance."
247
E. Covered Bond (Mortgage Bond) Market
In a mature economy, households tend to assume a net debt
position, and usually offer their dwellings as collateral for their
loans. Standard traditional practice rules that in these mortgage
operations the loan should not exceed 50% of the value of the
collateral, in other words, the Loan To Value ("LTV") ratio
should not exceed 50. Mortgages ceased to be a simple fact of
244. See ADAM ET AL., supra note 211, at 3.
245. See Werner Van Lembergen & Margaret G. Wachenfeld, Economic and Mone-
tary Union in Europe: Legal Implications of the Arrival of the Single Currency, 22 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1 (1998).
246. See PHILIPPE BAUTIER & LOUISE CORSELLI-NORDBLAND, INSURANCE AND PENSION
FUNDS IN EUROPE: A GROWING AND STILL RESTRUCTURING INSURANCE MARKET: DEVELOP-
MENT OF SUPPLEMENTARY PENSION FUNDS, (Eurostat No. 11, 2002), available at http://
epp.Eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1073,1135281,1073_1 1 35295&_dad=
POrtal&_schema=PORTAL&pproduct_code=4-24012002-AP (last visited June 21,
2005).
247. A study on a sample of bancassurance M&As shows evidence of capitalization
gains of 1% for the bidder and 5% for the target. See L. PAIGE FIELDS ET AL., WHAT'S
DIFFERENT ABOUT BANCASSURANCE? EVIDENCE OF WEALTH GAINS TO BANKS AND INSUR-
ANCE COMPANIES 2 (FMA Eur. Conf., 2005), available at http://www.fma.org/Siena/Pa-
pers/510050.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
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life when, in June 2003, the U.K. Treasury argued that structural
differences in housing and credit markets between the United
Kingdom and the continent were a significant impediment to
the United Kingdom's adoption of the Euro as the national cur-
rency.
248
When the market liberalized, UK mortgage firms actively of-
fered variable-rate mortgages, accepting for the first time very
high levels of LTV ratio, thereby mirroring the activity of U.S.
firms,24 9 which were then offering 125-LTV loans (that is, dis-
posed to lend up to 125% of the value of the collateral). Na-
tional planning process and housing regulations, effectively
clamping down on the supply of housing, contributed to step-
ping up the tension in the UK mortgage market. Waving aside
political implications, the whole episode could be seen as evi-
dence of a real necessity to back retail mortgage markets with
some second-tier structure.
An over-geared, non securitized mortgage market can be a
real instability factor for the whole economy, as shocks in the
short-term interest rates can soak available resources in the form
of mortgage payments, affecting consumer spending.
The European Mortgage Federation ("EMF") 25' defines
mortgage bonds (covered bonds) as "debt securities issued by
mortgage credit institutions and covered by certain types of as-
sets, usually mortgage loans, which remain on the balance sheet
of the issuer." Article 22(4) of the UCITS Directive, 251 which
most EU Member States have transposed into national legisla-
tion, establishes minimum standard criteria that mortgage bonds
have to meet.
248. SeeJohn Muellbauer, Property & Land, Taxation and the Economy After the
Barker Review 1 (July 13, 2004), available at http://hicks.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/cam-
eron/outlook/papers/ejjulyl 3full.pdf.
249. See RON ROARK & ANTHONY B. SANDERS, THE IMPACT OF EMU ON COMMERCIAL
PROPERTY AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS 7 (Comm. Mortgage Securities
Ass. ("CMBS") World, Vol. 2, 1999), available at http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/-sand-
ers/Euro4.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
250. See ANNIK LAMBERT, FUNDING MEASURES 17 (European Mortgage Federation
("EMF"), Third Workshop on Housing Finance in Transition Economies, Warsaw, Dec.
5-6, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/38/1845071.pdf.
251. European Parliament and Council Directive No. 2001/108/EC, O.J. L 41/35
(2002) (amending Council Directive 85/611/EEC on the coordination of laws, regula-
tions and administrative provisions relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment
in Transferable Securities ("UCITS"), with regard to investments of UCITS).
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(i.) The institution issuing the bonds has to have its regis-
tered office in an EU Member State.
(ii.) The bond-issuer must comply with its National Supervi-
sor regulations.
(iii.) There must be adequate coverage for depreciation and
liabilities for the entire duration of the investment.
(iv.) In the event of the bankruptcy of the issuer, bond-hold-
ers can recover their capital and interest before any other credi-
tor.2
52
The classic instrument on the European Mortgage market is
the Pfandbrief251 ("covered bond"), traditionally issued by Ger-
man mortgage banks for funding their operations. The risk pro-
file of the instrument is regulated by the German Mortgage
Bank Act: mortgage loans remain on the balance-sheet of the
issuer, although in legally separated asset pools, and must guar-
antee a mean loan-to-value ratio of 50% and 55%.254 In order
to reach this ratio, any surplus must be funded through other
debt instruments (usually, medium-term promissory notes).
"The Jumbo-Pfandbrief, the market segment for big-volume
issues"' 25 5 is very liquid, with at least three market-makers and
electronic trading. From July 2002, in an implicit recognition of
the maturity of the market, the Mortgage Bank Act permitted
issuers to engage in lending activities outside Europe.2 5 6
In order to lower the risk profiles of deals with a loan-to-
value ratio above 60%, the European mortgage industry lever-
aged on available financial instruments, developing the practice
of securitization.25 v If the mortgage loans are effectively "re-
moved from the originator's balance sheet",258 the transaction is
252. See TiM LASSEN, DEVELOPMENT OF MORTGAGE BONDS, (Association of German
Mortgage Banks, Third Workshop on Housing Finance in Transition Economies, War-
saw, Dec. 5-6, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/10/1844485.pdf.
253. For the key issues discussed at The Pfandbrief 2005 Conference, see The Pfandbrief
2005 Conference, London, United Kingdom, Apr. 21, 2005, available at http://www.euro
moneyconferences.com/events/event.asp?EventD=30.
254. Association of German Mortgage Banks, Mortgage Bank Act (Apr. 2004),
available at http://www.pfandbrief.org/attachments/hbgtextffbroschuere-engl.pdf
(last visited June 21, 2005).
255. See AsSOCIATION OF GERMAN MORTGAGE BANKS, THE PFANDBRIEF. EUROPE'S BIG-
GEST BOND MARKET 1 (2002), available at http://www.pfandbrief.org/attachments/ver-
band-publfb 2002e.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
256. See id. at 1.
257. See LASSEN, supra note 252, at 24.
258. See SHENGZHE WANG, TRUE SALE SECURIZATION IN GERMANY AND CHINA, 9 (Inst.
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called a true-sale securitization. True-sale structures account for
more than 90% of the market share in Europe. In a true-sale,
the bank establishes a separate legal entity, called a Special Pur-
pose Vehicle ("SPV") and sells mortgage loans to it.259 In this
way, the assets of the SPV are legally separated from those of the
originator and the vehicle can issue securities that are sold to
investors. Current rating procedures for a true-sale have set stan-
dards for risk-covering provisions: a fully funded cash reserve of
about 3% of the transaction size and an additional 10% stand-by
liquidity line for the first five years of operation. In contrast, if
the mortgage assets remain on the balance sheet at the originat-
ing bank, and only the credit default risk is transferred to the
investor, the transaction is called synthetic securitization: its end
product bears all the features of a credit default swap, with the
premium information that it originated from the mortgage mar-
ket.260 Synthetic securitizations, the dominant practice in the
German market, came about as a result of the complexity of
mortgage assets transfer procedures (it effectively circumvents
existing obligations in borrower notification and agreement)
and by the absence of national regulation in SPV fiscal treat-
ment.
2 61
The EMF, the central organization of mortgage lenders in
Europe, launched the European Covered Bond Council
("ECBC")2 6 2 during the EMF Conference on November 24 and
25, 2004.263 The aim of the ECBC is to promote dialogue be-
for L. & Fin., LL.M Thesis, Goethe Univ., Frankfurt am Main, Dec. 15, 2004), available
at http://www.vinodkothari.com/germany.htm; see also ANTHONY B. SANDERS, SECURIZA-
TION FUNDAMENTALS 22 (2005).
259. A Special Purpose Vehicle ("SPV") is a controlled entity enjoying a legal status
completely separate from the mother company, and is usually established for financing
purposes. See WILLIAM M. BURKE ET AL., HANDBOOK ON CROss-BoRDER SECURIZATION 9,
available at http://www.shearman.com/documents/CrossBorderSecu.pdf (last visited
June 20, 2005).
260. See Sabine Henke et al., Credit Securitization and Credit Derivatives:Financial
Instruments and the Credit Risk Management of Middle Market Commercial Loan
Portfolios 9(CFS Working Paper No.7, 1998), available at http://www.ifk-cfs.de/papers/
98_07.pdf
261. See WANG, supra note 258, at 9.
262. See Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Capital Markets and Financial Integration in
Europe, Speech at the Eur. Mortgage Fed. Annual Conf. (Nov. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2004/html/sp041123.en.html.
263. A panel consisting of Mr. Louis Hagen (the ECBC Chairman), Mr. Thierry
Dufour, Mr. Torben Gjede, Mr. David Balai, Mr. Antonio Torfo and Mrs. Judith Hardt
officially launched the European Covered Bond Council. See Eur. Mortgage Fed., EMF
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tween market participants and, at the same time, to sharpen the
profile of covered bonds in the public eye. A further purpose
will be to represent the joint positions of the covered bond in-
dustry by raising issues with the Commission and the Parliament
of the EU.
Moreover, the participation in the European Covered Bond
Council will not be reserved solely for members of the EMF. Ac-
cording to the EMF, covered bonds are the single largest compo-
nent of privately issued instruments "with the volume outstand-
ing at the end of 2003 amounting to over EUR 1.5 trillion," '264 a
3% increase with respect to 2002. Today there are active cov-
ered bond markets in almost twenty different European jurisdic-
tions and there is a strong expectation that the covered bond
market will continue to grow.265 For 2004, an overall growth of
up to 25% is expected.266
IV. OPEN ISSUES
A. European Capital Market - Geographical Structure
The European capital market is heavily localized, probably
as a consequence of frictional factors: the development of skills
in the financial services industry is a multi-generational process
and human resources cannot be easily resettled in another coun-
try. In the same way as in other sectors of economic activity, the
European capital market has become concentrated in a number
of local areas where strong competition is established around
specialized products. The reasons that led to the development
of these Regional Innovation Strategies267 range from historical
Annual Conference 2004: A Resounding Success, at http://www.emfconference.org
(last visited June 20, 2005).
264. See Eur. Mortgage Fed., European Covered Bond Council, A New Body to
Represent the Covered Bond Industry: Why?, at http://www.hypo.org/Content/De-
fault.asp?PageID=123.
265. "The Italian Ministry of Treasury and Finance... think that.., the first issue
coming to market sometime in the first half of 2006." NoRA COLOMER, COVERED BONDS:
HERE, THERE AND VERY SOON EVERYWHERE IN EUROPE (Asset Securitization Report,
SourceMedia, May 30, 2005), available at http://www.securitization.net/article.asp?id=l
&aid=4561.
266. See ASS'N OF GERMAN MORTGAGE BANKS, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT available at
http://www.pfandbrief.org/attachments/verband-publjb-2004e.pdf (last visited June
21, 2005).
267. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG REGIONAL POLICY, supra note 242, at 8.
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tradition, sociological and linguistic affinity to the availability of
a favorable institutional environment.
Spatial dispersion factors are not a relevant issue: Europe is
contained in only three time-zones and state-of-the-art Informa-
tion Technology ("IT") 26 infrastructures such as trading plat-
forms and real-time fund transfer systems, RTGS, 26 9  and
ACHs, 2 70 can help in keeping down the costs of localization. 2 71
According to Economic Growth theorists,27 2 technological spe-
cialization in a regional district can evolve in two different
ways.273 Smithian2 7 4 technological specialization, approximately
"learning by doing,"275 describes the marketplace as the force
leading to the optimal sizing of production processes.
On the other hand, Ricardian 276 technological specializa-
tion, "push pull,"277 regards technology transfer, creativity and
268. See Commission Communication COM(2005) 229 Final (to the Council, the
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Commit-
tee of the Regions "i2010 - A European Information Society for Growth and Employ-
ment"),June 1, (2005),{SEC(2005) 7171, available at http://europa.eu.int/information
_society/eeurope/i2010/docs/com-22992010 310505_fven.pdf; see also Press Re-
lease, European Commission, i2010 - A European Information Society for Growth and
Employment (June 1, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAc-
tion.do?reference=MEMO/05/184&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN&guiLan-
guage=EN; ROBERT G. FICHMAN, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION: A REVIEW OF
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH (MIT Sloan School of Mgmt., Cambridge, MA, June 1992), availa-
ble at http://www2.bc.edu/~fichman/Fichman_1992jCIS-lT DiffReview.pdf (last vis-
ited June 21, 2005).
269. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
271. See HM Treasury, The Location of Financial Activity and the Euro, EMU
Study, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/E3D/21/adnor
folk03_1234567 345.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
272. See B. Dalum et al., Does Specialization Matter for Growth, 8 INDUS & CORP.
CHANGE, 267, 288 (1999).
273. See ANDRE JUNGMITrAG, INNOVATIONS, TECHNOLOGICAL SPECIALIZATION AND Ec-
ONOMIC GROWTH IN THE EU 3 (Eur. Commission, D.G. for Eco. and Fin. Aff., Econ.
Papers No. 199, 2004), available at http://www.eu.int/comm/economy-finance/publi-
cations/economicpapers/2004/ecpI99en.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
274. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Edwin Cann ed., Random House 1994) (1776). Smith's treatise, composed
over more than twenty-seven years, established Economic Science as a branch of Social
Theory and Philosophy.
275. See JUNGMITTAG, supra note 273, at 3.
276. See id.; see also DAVID B. RICARDO, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxa-
tion, in 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO (Piero Sraffa ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1952) (1817).
277. See R. W. Zmud, An Examination of "Push-Pull" Theory Applied to Process Innova-
tion in Knowledge Work, 30 MGMT. ScI. 727, 727-738 (1984); see also Brian E. Mennecke,
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cross-breeding as the main drivers to achieve structural changes
to production processes. The European capital market appears
to have four distinct districts:
(i.) London 27" has successfully kept its role as the main en-
trance for foreign capital279 into the EMU. This is confirmed by
the steady growth of its market share relative to the issuance of
Euro-denominated bonds. The history of innovation and creativ-
ity in the design of financial instruments in the City of London is
probably the best example of Ricardian specialization applied to
Capital Markets;
(ii.) Frankfurt am Main, as the main gateway from EMU to
Switzerland, is affirming itself as the leader in Over-The-Counter
("OTC") 2' 0 derivatives and in cross-border payment systems;
(iii.) Dublin has established its financial district as the main
location for European fund management;
(iv.) the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg offers very conve-
nient legislation for the establishment of SPV. 2 8 1
An independent confirmation of the geographical structure
of the European Economy is the evidence of a disappointing
rate for the process of consolidation between banking institu-
tions. Regulators and analysts hoped the single currency would
launch a new wave of Mergers and Acquisitions ("M&A"), but,
after four years, Angeloni and Ehrman 282 evaluated the situa-
tion. They pointed out that: (i.) cross-border lending and de-
posit taking2 83 has shown a tendency to increase, but no dra-
matic changes have taken place; (ii.) inter-bank activity has been
rising sharply, 2 4 as further testimony of the integration of the
inter-bank capital market; (iii.) cross-border branch-establishing
activities remains negligible; and (iv.) M&A activities are indeed
Understanding the Role of Geographic Information Technologies in Business: Applications and
Research Directions, 1 (1) J. OF GEOGRAPHIC INFO. & DECISION ANALYSIS 44, 44-68 (1997).
278. See Leila Talani, Who Wins and Who Loses in the City of London, in AFTER THE
EURO: SHAPING INSTITUTIONS FOR GOVERNANCE IN THE WAKE OF EUROPEAN MONETARY
UNION 109 (Colin Crouch ed., 2000).
279. See RADLEY & ASSOCIATES, THE OUTLOOK FOR BANKS OPERATING IN THE CITY OF
LONDON (2004).
280. See BIS, Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market
Activity in 2001 (2002), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p020318.htm (last visited
June 21, 2005).
281. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
282. See Angeloni & Ehrmann, supra note 92, at 183.
283. See id.
284. See id.
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taking place, but at a level less than desired by regulators and
forecast by analysts.
In the literature, 8 5 many explanations have been given for
this phenomenon: (i.) the overall fragmentation of the lending
market 286 , due to the considerable proportion of small firms,
both on the lending and on the borrowing side; (ii.) the Euro-
pean tradition of relationship banking, entailing close ties be-
tween corporations and banks; (iii.) the hypothesis that banks
have defacto agreed not to compete in the retail market, at least
for the time being; and (iv.) the evidence of national obstacles in
M&A. As an example, the Italian NCB (Banca d'Italia), in its
role of national regulator for banking activity, has significantly
opposed most M&A activities directed towards Italian Banks.
While protectionism is still at work in Europe, it is significant
that the intervention of the Italian Regulator has been censored
by EU authorities, the media and most political parties.287
Still, the alternative exists as to whether the geographical
dispersion of capital markets in European economy is a distinc-
tive feature that should be preserved, or a problem that should
be addressed. Market forces and EU interventions are slowly
changing the landscape of the banking profession in the Euro-
area. From this standpoint, it appears that some distinctive re-
gional traditions are going to be abandoned, as a consequence
of: (i.) the mandatory adoption of International Standards both
at operational level (Basel II)... and at accounting level
285. See id. at 179.
286. See id. at 189.
287. "Italy is an attractive market for banks because of the country's high savings
rate. Italian households in 2003 saved 10.5% of their earnings, compared with 5.5% in
the U.K., according to the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development." Gregory Viscusi, Bank of Italy's Fazio Resists Pressure for Cross-Border Deals,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 31, 2005, available at http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=10000080&sid=ABCvP92cCSul. "Spanish banking giant BBVA has bid 6.4bn
Euros to take over Italy's Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, in which it holds a 15% stake
.... The government and the Bank of Italy are keen to keep Italy's banks in domestic
hands, despite pressure from the European Commission." Spanish Bank Plans Italian
Deal, BBC NEWS, Mar. 29, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4390
431.stm. "Dutch bank ABN Amro is to launch a 6.3bn Euro bid for Italian counterpart
Banca Antonveneta .... The bid will put pressure on Bank of Italy Governor Antonio
Fazio." ABNAmro Unveils Italian Bank Bid, BBC NEWS, Mar. 30, 2005, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4392801 .stm.
288. On June 24, 2004, the new capital adequacy framework, commonly known as
"Basel II," was published and submitted for review by NCBs and Banking Supervision
authorities. "The Basel II Framework sets out the details for adopting more risk-sensi-
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(JAS39)2 89 ; and (ii.) the emergence of the Single Euro Payments
Area.
290
B. EMU and EU - Mutual Roles and Objectives
Joining the European Union is both an economic and polit-
ical act,29' but adopting the Euro requires a much greater effort.
The ten accessing states292 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovak
Republic), which became members of the European Union on
May 1, 2004, appear eager to reach the required criteria and
adopt the Euro. Bulgaria and Romania are scheduled tojoin the
European Union in 2007.293
From a purely economic standpoint, the adoption of the
Euro is very convenient, as it brings to the new Member States
some saving from the pooling of National Reserves, minus the
reduced revenues from seigniorage activity. 29 4 The costs to be
paid are all at political level. The Maastricht Treaty's four eco-
tive minimum capital requirements for banking organizations .... It also seeks to
strengthen market discipline by enhancing transparency in banks' financial reporting."
Press Release, BIS, GIO Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision Endorse the
Publication of the Revised Capital Framework (June 26, 2004), available at: http://www.
bis.org/press/p040626.htm. See BASEL COMMIrrEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNA-
TIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED
FRAMEWORK (June 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm (last vis-
ited June 21, 2005); see also International Swaps and Derivatives Association ("ISDA"),
Institute of International Finance ("11F"), London Investment Banking Association
("LIBA"), Bond Market Association ("TBMA"), International Banking Federation
("IBF"), The Application of Basel II to Trading Activities and the Treatment of Double
Default Effects: A Response to the Basel/IOSCO Consultation (May 27, 2005), available
at http://www.iif.com/data/public/TBRCP-2005-Final-Response_052705.pdf
289. See Rossi et al., supra note 236.
290. See supra pt. II(D).
291. See Thomas J. Werlen, Legal Implication for Derivative Transactions and US Ap-
proach, 27(1), INT'L Bus. LAw. 28, (1999).
292. See Roger J. Goebel, The European Union in Transition: the Treaty of Nice in
Effect; Enlargement in Sight; A Constitution in Doubt, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 455 (2004)
[hereinafter Goebel, EU in Transition].
293. See European Commission, Enlargement, available at http://www.europa.eu.
int/comm/enlargement/enlargement.htm (last visited June 21, 2005).
294. The meaning of the term seigniorage has shifted from its older significance. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text. Now, the term covers any profit made by an NCB
in its money-printing activity. SeeJORGEN DRUD HANSEN & VITA KING, How TO CUT THE
SEIGNIORAGE CAKE IN AN ENLARGED EMU 8 (Int'l Workshop, Lith. - Nordic Research
Networking in Social Sci. 2003-2004 Working Paper, 2004), available at http://www.
Eurofakultetas.vu.lt/Nordic/JDHansen VKingSeigniorage.pdf (last visited June 21,
2005).
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nomic convergence criteria2 95 are: (i.) price stability (an aver-
age inflation rate not in excess by more than 1.5% that of the
three best-performing Member States); (ii.) budgetary discipline
(a public budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP and a public
debt ratio not exceeding 60% of GDP); (iii.) currency stability (a
minimum of two-years' permanence in the exchange rate mech-
anism, ERM-Il (2.25%), of the European Monetary System); and
(iv.) interest rate convergence (an average long-term interest
rate not exceeding by more than 2% that of the three best-per-
forming Member States) .296 A fifth criterion requires the inde-
pendence of the NCBs from political authorities. 297 Conformity
to the Maastricht criteria is assessed by the ECOFIN,298 on the
basis of reports by the European Commission and the ECB. Re-
cently,299 the EMU Member States and all the EU Member States
succeeded in improving the budgetary discipline criterion, sup-
porting a slight temporary overspend against the reference value
of the 3% of the deficit. "Rather than referring to a theoretical
list of relevant factors, the agreement sets out chapter headings,
that is general and basic principles enabling Member States and
institutions of the European Union to reach a better under-
standing of the treatment of the relevant factors. 3 °°
From a commercial standpoint, as the area of influence of
the Single Currency has already expanded beyond the original
EMU Member States without any political intervention, in due
course, attention of the observers has focused on the role Euro
can achieve on the international markets.
C. Euro as International Currency
Euro-area Member States have delegated to the ECB their
rights to lay out a monetary policy. As a result, the Euro is the
only currency not directly connected to political power.3 0 1 The
295. See EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 121, O.J. C 325/33 (2002).
296. See Goebel, Will the EMU Ever Fly?, supra note 4, at 304.
297. See EC Treaty supra note 19, art. 116(5), O.J. C 325/33 (2002).
298. See supra note 108.
299. See Council(ECOFIN) Report to the European Council Improving the imple-
mentation of the Stability and Growth Pact, No. 7423/05, March 21, 2005, also available
at http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents-travail/2005/03/21stab/stab.pdf
300. See Press Release, Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the European
Union, Agreement on the Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (Mar. 21, 2005),
available at http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/communiques/2005/03/21stab/.
301. See CHRISTA RANDZIO-PLATH & TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA, THE EUROPEAN
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success of the Euro in capital markets could well reflect the
growing trend towards less political control over the economy.30 2
Before the introduction of the Euro, the management of
Interest Rates and of National Reserves were the two main activi-
ties of a NCB 303 In the handling of National Reserves two pri-
mary objectives can be recognized: (i.) in order to protect their
National Economies from foreign-exchange shocks, NCBs influ-
ence the quotations of their National Currencies, by selling or
buying on the Foreign Exchange markets, (Intervention role of
National Reserves); (ii.) when not involved in intervention, Na-
tional Reserves, as any other form of capital, should bring an
adequate revenue to their owners (Investment role of National
Reserves).3 °4 In order to realize these objectives, NCBs usually
resort to some form of "currency anchoring. 3 0 5
Acting against current market trends (i.e., buying when the
majority offers to sell and selling when others are trying to buy)
the intervention of NCBs is usually carried out in order to main-
tain a predefined parity level between its National Currency and
some other reference currencies.3 °6 Backed as they are by Na-
tional Reserves, even the mere intentions of a National Central
Bank can alter the trend of the market: accordingly, NCBs do
not routinely publish their guidelines for intervention, but rely
on episodic announcements. After an analysis of all the arrange-
ments that developed over the years in different countries, four
main alternatives of currency anchoring can be detected.30 7
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND AccoUNTABILITY 1 (Center for Eur. Integration
Studies("ZEI"), Policy Paper No. 16, 2000), available at urw.zei.de/download/zeLwp/BOJ-
02.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
302. See id.; see alsoJoaqufn Almunia, The Success Story of Creating the Euro and
Future Challenges, Speech at Euro Conference, Amsterdam, (Oct. 11, 2004), available
at http://Europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/447&
format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
303. See Charles Enochand & Marc Quintyn, European Monetary Union: Operating
Monetary Policy, FIN. & DEVT., Sept. 1996, at 31, available at http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/fandd/1996/09/pdf/enoch.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
304. See AXILROD, supra note 62, at 1.
305. See ECB, Review of the International Role of the Euro (2003), at 43, available
at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/Eurointernationalrole2003en.pdf
306. See GUNNAR HEINSOHN & OTTO STEIGER, THE EUROSYSTEM AND THE ART OF
CENTRAL BANKING 9 (Center for Eur. Integration Studies ("ZEI"), Paper No. BIl, 2002),
available at urww.zei.de/download/zeLuwp/B02-11.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
307. See ECB, Review of the International Role of the Euro, supra note 305, at 43;
see also Giorgio Bellettini, The International Role of the Euro (2004), at 3, available at :I
/www.dse.unibo.it/belletti/lectures.doc
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At first level, an NCB can announce the presence of the
Euro on its currency board, tableau de bord. By doing so, the NCB
admits that it is monitoring the exchange rate between its Na-
tional Currency and the Euro, and that rate plays a role in its
policy of intervention. This approach is followed, among others,
by Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Estonia. °
As international trade develops and the National Economy
becomes increasingly dependent on monetary stability, an NCB
cannot rely on the simple tableau de bord to supervise its currency.
Economists name a currency basket the mathematical process of
averaging the rates of a set of currencies, usually weighted by
their relevance in international trade.3 0 9 The NCBs of Hungary,
Iceland, Poland, Commonwealth of Independent States ("CSI"),
and Ukraine have announced that Euro features in each of their
currency baskets (used for setting a reference for each of their
National Currencies).
At a more binding level, an NCB can announce that the
Euro has become its anchor currency: the Single Currency is the
only reference in setting its monetary policy. Thus its National
Currency will follow the trend set by the Euro, although with
some slack and delay. This shadowing practice is favored by
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 1 °
Finally, an NCB can set for its National Currency a fixed
exchange rate against the Euro. This approach, known as peg-
ging, has been adopted by Denmark, Cyprus and Macedonia. 1
The area of influence for the Euro is not limited to Europe: as a
consequence of their colonial history, a number of African States
have kept their National Currencies pegged to the French Franc.
With the advent of the Euro, they simply chose to move
their peg to the new currency: as a result, both the eight west-
African countries of the "Commonaut6 Financi~re de l'Afrique"
and the six central-African countries of the "Cooperation
Financiere Africaine ' 12, have a national currency (the CFA
308. See ECB, Review of the International Role of the Euro, supra note 305, at 44.
309. See SRICHANDER RAMASWAMY, RESERVE CURRENCY ALLOCATION: AN ALTERNA-
TIVE METHODOLOGY 5(BIS Working Paper No. 72, 1999).
310. See ECB, Review of the International Role of the Euro, supra note 305, at 49.
311. See id. at 43.
312. Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial
Guinea and Gabon, constitute the Coopration FinanciRre Africaine. See Bellettini,
supra note 307, at 11.
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Euro) pegged to the Euro.31 3 The success of the Euro appears as
confirmation of a world trend toward limiting the money-creat-
ing autonomy of NCBs, and therefore the number of indepen-
dent global currencies.
Independent NCBs are beginning to recognize that they
cannot offer for their National Debt issues at an interest rate
below that set by ECB or by the Federal Reserve. Moreover, they
are also recognized that they do not possess the liquidity to oper-
ate against the Dollar or the Euro capital markets. 31 4 A country
with strong links to the Euro-area has three basic alternatives:
(i.) a complete membership, which means its National Cen-
tral Bank has to delegate its monetary policy to the ECB;
(ii.) a committed policy of pegging or shadowing the Euro,
de facto limiting the power of its NCB;
(iii.) a traditional approach, trusting its National Central
Bank with the relative power of the currency board or of the
currency basket.
Even these more autonomous NCBs, however, have started
to feel the effects of the appearance of the Euro on capital mar-
kets on their National Reserves.
D. Euro as Reserve Currency
From a purely financial point of view, in order to manage its
National Reserves, a Central Bank has to bear a transaction cost
(which depends on its interventions on the market) and the
equivalent costs of three (global-economy dependent) risk fac-
tors: interest risk, foreign exchange risk and credit risk." 5 The
transaction costs are estimated by the average difference be-
tween sell and buy prices, and are usually assumed to be in in-
verse relationship with the liquidity of the market. When there is
a relative abundance of buyers and sellers, there is little space for
negotiation: if a deal is refused, it is easier to forward it to some-
body else.
313. See Siim Kallas, The Euro's Contribution to the Financial System and Global
Stability, Speech at Euro Conference, Amsterdam, at 4 (Oct. 12, 2004), available at
http://Europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/450&for-
mat=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
314. See Rudi Dornbusch, The Euro: Implications for Latin America, Mass. Inst. of
Tech., Mar. 16, 1999, available at http://www.mit.edu/-rudi/media/PDFs/elatin.pdf.
315. IMF, Guidelines for Foreign Exchange Reserve Management, (Aug. 2004),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ferm/guidelines/200 4 /0 81604.pdf
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When operators become scarcer, the difference between
sell and buy prices increases, reflecting the need for a tougher
negotiation. Until the advent of the Euro, only the U.S. capital
market featured low transaction costs and, therefore, the dollar
was almost the only currency featured in National Reserves. 16
Now, the Euro can be thought of as a second-best reserve cur-
rency, as its gross capital market features sufficient liquidity and
its transaction costs are comparable to those experienced on the
dollar-based capital markets.
Interest risk and foreign exchange risk factors can be evalu-
ated only in the short term, for a number of reasons: (i.) the
interventions of the National Central Bank itself modify foreign
exchange rates; (ii.) in the management of National Reserves,
the decisions of anchoring, intervention and investment are in-
terrelated; (iii.) the increased presence of managers from the
fund industry is evidence of a trend towards a more active man-
agement of National Reserves. ty Past and present episodes warn
that, sometimes, the costs of keeping a peg to the U.S. dollar can
be just too expensive: in the last decade, Argentina 31 8 fell victim
of this strategy of dollarization" 9 which caused a severe reces-
sion. In January 2002, finally, Eduardo Duhalde, Argentina's
fifth leader in two weeks, declared officially the default on the
nation's foreign debt, estimated at U.S.$141 billion; it was the
biggest default in history. 320
In November 1997, after the onset of an East Asian crisis,
the Russian Rouble came under speculative attack.32 t In this epi-
316. See Salvatore, The Euro: Expectations and Performance, supra note 39, at 121.
317. See BARRY EICHENGREEN & DONALDJ. MATHIESON, THE CURRENCY COMPOSITION
OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT (IMF Working Paper No.
131, 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wpOO13l.pdf
(last visited June 15, 2005).
318. See Christian Noyer, The International Impact of the Euro, ECB, Speech (Jan.
2000), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2000/html/spOO0113.en.html
(last visited June 15, 2005).
319. Dollarization is a strong pegging of a national currency to the dollar. See
Dominick Salvatore, Euroization, Dollarization, and the International Monetary System, in
MONETARY UNIONS AND HARD PEGS 27-40 (Alexander et al., eds., 2004).
320. See Argentina Officially Defaults, BBC NEWS, Jan. 3, 2002, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1740896.stm.
321. See JOHN J. MERRICK JR., CRISIS DYNAMICS OF IMPLIED DEFAULT RECOVERY RA-
TIOS: EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIA AND ARGENTINA, (Stern Sch. of Bus., NYU, Working Paper,
November 1999), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/fin/workpapers/papers99/
wpa99052.pdf (last visited June 15, 2005).
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sode, the Central Bank of Russia ("CBR") aggressively defended
the parity of its National Currency, losing nearly U.S.$6 billion in
foreign-exchange reserves322 , but in the end it was unable to pre-
vent the default of its National Public Debt. The widespread in-
stability that followed involved even some of the speculators
which originated the attack.
During the last year, some NCBs invested hugely in U.S.
Federal Reserve Bonds, in an attempt to maintain favorable con-
ditions for their exports, nominally, a high USD foreign ex-
change rate and a low U.S. domestic interest rate.323 The results
of this policy are shown in the following diagram, based on data
from the Federal Reserve's Treasury International Capital Sys-
tem. 3
2 4
Japan's position is so strong that it has to be recorded on
the right-hand scale, while the assets of the next four greatest
buyers of Treasury Bonds (People's Republic of China, United
Kingdom, Republic of Korea, and the aggregate of Caribbean
countries) can be described by the vertical scale on the left.
All these Central Banks are now victims of the "Prisoner's
Dilemma:"3 25  acting in their intervention role, they invested
most of their National Reserves in dollar-based assets. As the
market is slowly turning against the dollar, they are realizing that
there is no formal agreement forbidding one of them to cut its
own losses, by dumping its dollar assets on the market. The first
322. See Abbigail J. Chiodo & Michael T. Owyang, A Case Study of a Currency Crisis:
The Russian Default of 1998, FED. RESERV. BANK OF ST. Louis REv., Sept./Nov. 2002, at 7,
available at http://research.stfouisfed.org/publications/review/02/11 /ChiodoOwyang.
pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
323. See Matthew Higgins & Thomas Klitgaard, Reserve Accumulation: Implications for
Global Capital Flows and Financial Markets, 10(10) N.Y. FED. RESERV. BANK, CURRENT Is-
SUES IN ECON. AND FIN., Sept./Oct. 2004, at 1, available at http://www.ny.frb.org/re-
search/currentissues/cilO-10.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
324. See U.S Department of the Treasury, Treasury International Capital System,
Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/
mfhhis01.txt (last visited June 21, 2005) (for the data up to May 2004); see also id.,
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt (last visitedJuly 4, 2005) (for the subse-
quent data).
325. SeeJOHN NASH, Two-Person Cooperative Games, in THE ESSENTIALJOHN NASH 99
(Harold W. Kuhn & Sylvia Nasar eds., 2002). The Prisoner's Dilemma is one of the first
examples considered in Mathematical Game Theory. It derives its name from the tradi-
tional policy of giving a remission to the first suspect to confess, in exchange for collab-
oration against the others. Its name has extended to cover all the situations in which
the first player to do something wins, at the prejudice to everybody else (a particular
case of non-zero sum games).
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TABLE 8:
THE FIVE MAJOR INVESTORS IN U.S. PUBLIC DEBT
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one to back off from its investment could experience much less
damage than the others.
On the other hand, its action could send shockwaves
throughout its National Economy, and, in a longer term, this
could lead to instability in the whole Asian economy.
As time is slowly finding a way out of this impasse, the epi-
sode will probably be remembered as the confirmation of the
importance of the investment role of National Reserves. The
availability of a second currency for allocating National Reserves
should be considered a welcome novelty, as it offers Reserve
Managers the opportunity of improving both stability and prof-
its.
CONCLUSION
Economic and Monetary Union Member States have tried
to establish a sound macroeconomic framework characterized by
price stability, sound public finances and low interest rates. The
Euro-area as a whole is far better equipped to withstand eco-
nomic shocks than the previous national economies: moreover,
corporations can benefit from lower costs of doing business in
Europe. Backed by a liquid and integrated money market, the
Euro is poised to become the major currency in all transactions
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where the dollar is not feasible for political or economical rea-
sons.
Some work has still to be done, however, to attain the level
of integration at which U.S. bond and equity markets have been
operating in the recent years. 26
326. See Trichet, supra note 69 ("Wholesale money and bond markets tend to be
relatively well integrated, but only the unsecured Euro money market has reached a
fully satisfactory challenges, level of integration.").
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